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Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal
Defense of the Universality of
International Human Rights
Robert D. Sloane*
ABSTRACT

This Article seeks to provide a new framework, rooted in

classical liberalism, for understanding and defending the
universality of internationalhuman rights. After reviewing the

philosophical and historical development of the idea of
universality, Part 11 argues that none of the traditional

justifications for conceiving of internationalhuman rights as
universal succeed.
Cultural pluralism therefore must be
accepted as a descriptive truth. But to acknowledge the cultural
contingency of values as a descriptive claim does not, by itself,
undermine the normative claim that human rights are, or
should be, universal. Instead, it points to the need to justify
universality within a framework that acknowledges the
descriptive truth of culturalpluralism.
PartIII distinguishestwo plausible normative claims that
a cultural relativistcould advance on the basis of the descriptive
vindication of cultural pluralism provided in Part ff.
"narrative relativism" and "crude relativism." Narrative
relativism questions whether it is appropriateand desirable to
apply the Western liberal conception of rights to cultures whose
traditional narrative frameworks-deeply rooted norms,
perceptions, and values-may not be able to accommodate them
without upsetting societal institutions in potentially dangerous
ways.
This raises an issue that undoubtedly merits
considerationwhen applying human rights law internationally.
But this Article argues that it does not "refute" the universality
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of international human rights law any more than
acknowledging value pluralism within a nation refutes the
uniform application of domestic law to a state's diverse
citizenry. This Article then argues that crude relativism-the
broader normative claim that it is wrong to impose human
rights on cultures that claim to reject them-suffers from several
deep logical and empirical flaws that undermine its
philosophical coherence as an argument and also call into
question the sincerity of its proponents' views.
In Part IV, this Article argues that a distinctively liberal
conception of autonomy both underlies and, upon analysis,
undermines the central normative assertions of cultural
relativism. This is because the liberal imperative to respect the
value of autonomy originates in a unique conception of the
"self," which finds expression, among other places, in Isaiah
Berlin's classic essay on "Two Concepts of Liberty." Part IV
argue that cultural relativists in fact invoke-and, absent some
presently unarticulated alternative, must invoke-the liberal
conception of autonomy in any argument that aims to repudiate
the universality of internationalhuman rights. But because the
liberal conception of autonomy is rooted in a distinctive
conception of the "self as agent," a state elite cannot, for
example, appeal to the liberal values of autonomy to challenge
human rights law as "imperialistic"-forfailing to extend
adequate tolerance to culturalpluralism-but then conveniently
reject these very same values when individuals within their
polity invoke them in the form of human rights claims.
This Article further argues that any assertion that cultural
groups or political entities also merit tolerance and respect for
their autonomy is necessarily derivative, not independent, of the
rationalefor respecting individual autonomy. A cultural elite
remains free to repudiate this value. It cannot, however, then
demand respect for "culturalautonomy" as a rhetoricaldevice to
deflect criticism of its human rights practices. By contrast, to
embrace this conception of autonomy is necessarily to
acknowledge the normative claim to universality that this
Article argues internationalhuman rights law enjoys. Despite
the descriptive truth of cultural pluralism, this Article
concludes that there is a compelling philosophical rationalebeyond the political, historical, and legal approaches
conventionally invoked in defense of international human
rights-for choosing "rights"as the appropriateand universal
functional concept to promote human dignity internationally.
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It is related that at one of the meetings of a UNESCO National
Commission where human rights were being discussed, someone
expressed astonishment that certain champions of violently opposed
ideologies had agreed on a list of those rights. 'Yes.' they said, 'we
agree about the rights but on condition that no one asks us why: That
'why' is where the argument begins.
-Jacques Maritain

1.
Jacques Maritain, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERPRETATIONS 9 (UNESCO ed., 1949) [hereinafter HUtAN RIGHTS).

I

COMMENTS

&
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1993 at the Second World Conference on Human Rights,
national delegates from around the globe adopted the Vienna
Declaration:
"all human rights are universal, indivisible and
interdependent and interrelated.
,,2 Like most rhetoric-in
particular, rhetoric that surrounds human rights discourse-the
Declaration's compelling language veils acute problems that emerge
the moment one strives to bring its abstract claims to bear upon real
world affairs and normative claims. 3 But precisely this aspiration
makes the human rights movement worthwhile.
Should the
discourse of human rights remain in theoretical limbo, solely the
subject of armchair philosophy, then the very concept of human rights
law becomes quixotic. Only insofar as human rights discourse enacts,
or maintains the potential to enact, concrete changes in the behavior
of international actors does the human rights movement retain its
value. Only insofar as one can articulate what claims this discourse
supports can the movement begin to realize the lofty ideals that
permeate its rhetoric.
Many conceptual and practical difficulties confront universal
human rights: Who has rights? Do individuals alone have rights or
can groups-ethnic, religious, racial, or cultural-assert valid human
rights claims, and can the claims of each be reconciled? 4 Should civil
and political rights remain primary, or do social, economic, and
cultural rights warrant equivalent status? 5 How should human

2.
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human
Rights, Part I, para. 5, U.N. Doc. AICONF/157/23 (1993).
3.
See Jonathan Mann, Introduction to Symposium, Universalism and
Cultural Relativism: Perspectives on the Human Rights Debate, in HUMAN RIGHTS AT
HARVARD 9 (Apr. 5, 1997) ("[The declaration on universal human rights that emerged
at the World Conference in Vienna in 1993 was the thinnest possible papering over of
the growing gulf in the political discourse on these issues.").
4.
For a compelling philosophical defense of the compatibility of certain "group
rights" with liberalism's presumptive focus on the autonomous individual subject, see
generally WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP (1995).
5.
Jack Donnelly, among others, argues that these two categories of rights,
traditionally conceived in tension with one another, in fact remain inextricably
intertwined. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS INTHEORY & PRACTICE 2834 (1989) (arguing that the dichotomy between civil and political rights, on the one
hand, and social, economic and cultural rights, on the other, reflects a crude
oversimplification because both forms of rights require positive state action to be
genuinely realized, and not, as commonly assumed, mere negative restraint in the case
of the former); see also Thomas Pogge, How Should Human Rights be Conceived? 11
(manuscript, on file with author), reprintedin JAHRBUCK FOR KETCH UND ETHIK 103.20
(1995); THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: READING IN CONTEXT 187-210 (Patrick
Hayden ed., 2001) (proposing a model of human rights that rejects the dichotomy
between, on the one hand, "negative" libertarian restraints and, on the other, "positive"
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rights be enforced?
Which domestic and international arenas
constitute the appropriate fora in which to press human rights
claims?

6

This Article brackets these debates-except insofar as they are
implicated tangentially-and proposes a new answer to-or, at least,
a new way to think about-what arguably remains the most serious
challenge to universal human rights: cultural relativism. Simply
stated, cultural relativism insists that human rights cannot be
universal because, as a matter of social fact, cultures maintain highly
divergent mores and conceptualize human rights differently, or not at
all, and these mores conflict in intractable ways that belie
pretensions to "universality."
Cultural relativism, then, poses both theoretical and practical
challenges. Theoretically, universal human rights imply, at a
minimum, some set of "morally weighty" social norms that preempt,
under all but the most exigent circumstances, other cultural value
priorities. 7 '"Rights," as Jack Donnelly argues, "are 'interests' that
have been specially entrenched in a system of justifications and
thereby substantially transformed, giving them priority, in ordinary
circumstances, over, for example, utilitarian calculations, mere
interests, or considerations of social policy ... which otherwise would
be not only appropriate, but decisive, reasons for public or private
action." s But how can one set of values-international human
rights-warrant universal acknowledgment as peremptory norms
when, as a matter of social fact, highly divergent practices, morals,
goals, and value hierarchies deeply divide the world's multiple and
diverse civilizations? 9 Practically, universal human rights must
provide guidance about when and under what conditions
international actors may intervene justifiably in the affairs of
sovereign states to deter, terminate, or redress human rights

duties, in favor of an "institutional understanding" whereby "[b~y postulating a person
Ps right to X as a human right we are asserting that Fs society ought to be
(re)organized in such a way that P has secure access to X and, in particular, so that P
is secure against being denied X or deprived of X officially: by the government or its
agents or officials"). These views repudiate the standard objection that, properly
spealdng, social, economic and cultural rights cannot-or should not-be considered
true "rights." E.g., Controversies and Culture, A Survey of Human-Rights Law,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1998, at 9 [hereinafter Controversiesand Culture].
6.
For an overview of the legal institutions and processes available to
implement international human rights law, see generally HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP
ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT (1996).
7.
Human rights denote "a special class of moral concerns, namely ones that
are among the most weighty of all as well as unrestricted and broadly shamble."
Pogge, supra note 5, at 1.
8.
JACK DONNELLY, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (1985).
9.
Kymliclm observes that "the world's 184 states contain over 600 living
language groups, and 5,000 ethnic groups." KYMLICKA, supra note 4, at 1.
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violations. If, however, certain cultural traditions permit-perhaps
even encourage-practices deemed morally abhorrent by other
societies,1 0 by what criteria do we decide whether they violate
"universal" standards that warrant international intervention?
For public international law, this question presents a serious
difficulty. Traditional state sovereignty-the idea that what occurs
exclusively within the territory of a state remains solely within its
domestic competence-no longer constitutes the paramount principle
of international law; it has been weakened, in fact, precisely by the
post-World War II international human rights movement." But by
no means has the primacy of state sovereignty been abandoned. The
UN Charter affirms that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
2
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.'
Furthermore, nations continue to object vociferously to international
interference with, or even judgment of, their domestic affairs on the
13
basis of alleged "universal" human rights standards.
Those affairs, however, no longer remain wholly exempt from
international scrutiny. Most nations acknowledge, at least in theory,
that certain categories of state action are not "matters which are

10.

Bernard Williams, for instance, recalls an incident from Bernal de Diaz's

account of Cortez's initial encounter with the Aztecs. Recounting the horror expressed
by the Spanish upon observing Aztec sacrificial practices, he writes, "It would surely be
absurd to regard this reaction as merely parochial or self-righteous. It rather indicated
something which their conduct did not indicate, that they regarded the Indians as men
rather than as wild animals." Bernard Williams, An Inconsistent Form of Relativism, in
RELATIVISM: COGNITIVE & MORAL 173 (Jack W. Meiland & Michael Krausz eds., 1982).
William's anecdote does not demonstrate that the Spanish were more "humane" than
the Aztecs. Indeed, contemporaneously, leaders of the Spanish Inquisition were
committing atrocities equally, if not more, abhorrent by reference to contemporary
morals.
It indicates, however, the ubiquitous tendency of cultures to ascribe
universality to their understanding of what constitutes genuinely "human" behavior.
11.
See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 557 (5th ed.
1998); see also SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 35 (1996) ("While states remain the primary actors in
world affairs, they also are suffering losses in sovereignty, functions, and power.
International institutions now assert the right to judge and to constrain what states do
in their own territory.").
12.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
13.
See Louis Henkin, Human Rights: Reappraisal and Readjustment, in
ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND JEWISH PERSPECTIVES 70
(David Sidorsky ed., 1979) [hereinafter ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS] ("Even states
substantially committed to human rights resist having their behavior scrutinized by
others who may have political or other ulterior motives for criticizing them."). The
People's Republic of China frequently objects to international human rights scrutiny on
this basis. E.g., China: Another U.S. Attempt to Use Human Rights to Create
Confrontation: Comments on U.S. State Department 1996 Human Rights Report on
China Information Office, State Council, BEIJING REV., Apr. 7, 1997, at 14, 1997 WL
10062717; see also James 0. Goldsborough, The U.S. Can't Punish China for Not Being
More Like America, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., May 26, 1994, 1994 WL 5451178.
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essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state"international human rights violations. What counts as a human
rights violation, then, assumes tremendous significance. For to
concede that some state practice violates universal human rights
standards implies that the international community may justifiably
interfere in the internal affairs of that state to deter, terminate, or
redress the practice. States, therefore, maintain a significant stake
in delimiting the scope of international human rights and, in
particular, in ensuring that social, cultural, and political practices
embedded in the fabric of the society or societies within their territory
remain outside the class of universal norms that vindicate
international interference.
This article pursues two related objectives. First, it seeks to
defend a conception of universal human rights that does not deny the
empirical validity of cultural relativism-nor does it concede the
normative assertions that many cultural relativists assume follow
from this concession. Second, it argues that, given this conception of
universality, most human rights critiques that rely upon relativism
fail to establish their objective-in particular, they do not undermine
the legitimacy of imposing certain human rights norms on states that
purport to reject them for cultural relativist reasons.
Part II considers briefly the philosophical and historical pedigree
of universal human rights. It offers some historical background
regarding the Western liberal traditions that relativist critiques often
target, and it discusses the genesis of universal human rights-as
manifested in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR)14 -in the aftermath of World War H. Finally, it sets
forth several alternative grounds upon which the universality of
human rights might plausibly be claimed.
Each, for reasons
elaborated below, is ultimately rejected. Part II therefore concludes
by embracing cultural relativism as a descriptive truth: All norms
and standards-including those that comprise universal human
rights-reflect historically and culturally contingent values.
It
remains to determine, however, what normative consequences this
concession compels.
Part III restates the normative challenge that cultural
relativism-henceforth presumed to be descriptively unassailableposes for international human rights. In particular, it appears to
suggest that, under some circumstances, interference in the affairs of
a sovereign state in the guise of protecting or enforcing universal
human rights amounts to "cultural imperialism"-the unjustified or
inappropriate imposition of one set of contingent norms on a culture

14.

G-A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71. U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948).
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that does not share them. 15 Part III distinguishes two plausible
normative claims that might be advanced on the basis of this
assertion.
The first, labeled "narrative relativism,"16 does not
necessarily reject universal human rights wholesale or suggest that
imposing foreign cultural values is morally wrong. Instead, narrative
relativism calls attention to the failure of universal human rights to
acknowledge the critical reliance of cultures on implicit narratives
that inform their normative framework. As Robert Cover succinctly
puts it, "[N]o set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart
from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning." 17 Universal
human rights law-from this perspective-might be dangerous; wellintentioned legal norms may upset key features of a community's
sociopolitical order, causing local dissonance that outweighs the
alleged benefits of an overarching regime structured by respect for
international human rights.
Alternatively, international human
rights law, in the narrative relativist's view, may prove misguided;
alleged universal norms may fail to comprehend adequately the
positive roles served by cultural narratives that fail to conform to its,
8
perhaps myopic, prescriptions.'
Narrative relativism, under some circumstances, states a
legitimate concern for universal human rights.
It invites a
consideration of the relative desirability of certain kinds of human
rights activism that threaten to upset indigenous cultural mores. But
narrative relativism, Part III(A) argues, fails to provide reason to
abandon the project of universal human rights.
First, as some

15.
HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 21, 28 (arguing that "[a]s their power and
self-confidence increase, non-Western societies increasingly assert their own cultural
values and reject those 'imposed' on them by the West").
16.
Robert Cover, Nomos & Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983). Narrative
relativism corresponds roughly to the non-self-refuting alternative form of moral
relativism that Bernard Williams calls "appraisal relativism." Williams argues that an
individual rooted in one historically and culturally contingent "nomos"-to adopt
Cover's terminology-cannot appraise another by means of neutral criteria. Appraisal
relativism suggests, then, that the conceptual apparatus-vocabulary, beliefs, and
modes of thought-available in one nomos does not overlap sufficiently with another to
permit an individual rooted in the former meaningfully to appraise the latter. See
generally Bernard Williams, The Truth in Relativism, in RELATIVISM: COGNITIVE &
MORAL, supranote 10, at 175.
17.
Cover, supra note 16, at 4.
18.
The northern African practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) provides
a paradigmatic example. Responding to a New York Times editorial, one woman wrote,
"A.M. Rosenthal condemns female circumcision, a traditional practice common to many
African and Arabic peoples, as 'female mutilation' . . . .

From the Western liberal

tradition, and certainly from the feminist perspective, Mr. Rosenthal is correct.
However, from the African viewpoint the practice can serve as an affirmation of the
value of woman in traditional society ....

A better approach would be for Western

peoples to try to understand the importance of these traditions to those who practice
them." Letter to the Editor,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1993, at A24, reprinted in STEINER &
ALSTON, supra note 6, at 253-54.
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scholars argue, many of its claims-that certain traditional societies
value the well-being of the community above individual rights, or that
the devaluation of civil and political rights facilitates economic and
social stability in developing nations-prove empirical, and evidence
tending to establish these empirical claims remains, at best,
inconclusive. Second, and more critically, cultural variations in
norms, values, and moral perceptions do not necessarily challenge the
idea of an overarching international framework structured around
universal human rights; rather, narrative relativism forces one to
appraise the extent to which different systems of cultural mores that
exist at the level of microlaw remain compatible with a macrolegal
system governed by the standards of universal human rights.1 9 In
the Author's view, however, domestic legal compliance with this
component of international law does not demand or even suggest
cultural homogenization because values of reasonable tolerance and
autonomy form the very foundation of universal human rights law.
This observation, standing alone, does not diffuse the relativist
challenge. While universal human rights arguably permit diverse
cultural communities considerable latitude to subsist within a
common international legal order, by no means do all cultural values
and practices conform to its prescriptions. The question also remains
whether the fact of cultural pluralism implies that international
human rights law should tolerate those that do not. Narrative
relativism therefore invites inquiry into a more foundational
question: Why does universal human rights law-as one peculiar
mechanism for promoting human dignity-merit acknowledgment as
the paramount international standard by which to appraise domestic
legal regimes and cultural practices?
Part I1(B) takes up this inquiry by analyzing a second, and
substantially broader, cultural relativist claim, designated "crude
cultural relativism." Crude cultural relativism insists that to
acknowledge cultural pluralism implies that the coercive imposition
of one culture's norms onto another that purports to reject them is
morally illegitimate. 20
This Article argues that this position
frequently proves a disingenuous, or simply unsupported, empirical
claim. Moreover, even assuming its empirical respectability and
sincerity, crude relativism remains philosophically unsatisfactory in
two principal respects. First, it suffers from a foundational error of
logic. Crude relativism asserts, at once, that all values are relativeculturally and historically contingent-but that, nonetheless, to

19.
(1999).
20.
evaluating
note 10, at

See generally W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNrES 149-76
Crude cultural relativism corresponds roughly to what Bernard Williams,
moral relativism generally, denotes "vulgar relativism." Williams, supra
171.
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impose one set of values on an agent or group that rejects them is
objectively wrong. It claims, in other words, that one value-the
norm against coercive imposition-demands universal respect
notwithstanding the descriptive truth of relativism. To embrace
crude relativism descriptively, then, requires abandoning the very
normative critique of human rights universalism that, ironically,
relativists often assume follows from it.21 Second, crude cultural
relativism presumes that a nation-state's government and its
objectives may be identified justifiably with the cultural values and
desires of its populace. But several considerations militate against
this simple identification, particularly in states that lack genuine
democratic institutions, a characteristic feature of most chronic
human rights violators. Cultural relativist rhetoric thus often proves
more a tool of state elites to vindicate control over their citizenry than
a genuine reflection of deeply held cultural values of the populace.
None of these arguments refutes cultural relativism as a
descriptive proposition. They establish, at best, that we lack noncontingent criteria-which refers to standards independent of specific
historical, cultural, and linguistic contexts-to evaluate competing
value hierarchies. But the absence of neutral, non-contingent criteria
does not repudiate the normative universality of human rights; it
demonstrates, more modestly, that "universal" must not be
understood in a transcendental or ontological sense-as a scientific
claim about the "true" nature of the world and its inhabitants.
Indeed, the emphasis throughout this Article is that a nontranscendental conception of universality is not only empirically
accurate, but intrinsically desirable.
To claim that universal
connotes "objectively true" is to deny that reasonable individuals can
hold disparate, but equally valid, opinions about ultimate questions of
value. But the possibility, indeed, even desirability, of these differing
opinions-about politics, ethics, the nature of the "good life," and so
forth-is inextricably intertwined with the very protections that
universal human rights law strives to extend to all individuals, such
as freedoms of association, speech, and political and religious belief.
Thus, somewhat paradoxically, universal human rights law derives
its greatest virtue-and perhaps its most compelling claim to
normative universality-precisely from its emphasis on the
traditional liberal tolerance of reasonable value pluralism.

21.
Relativism does not establish that human rights comprise a form of
"cultural imperialism." Any relativist argument to this effect necessarily relies on a
perhaps tacit, but nonetheless essential, predicate that some universal norm
proscribing coercion exists. But the theoretical core of crude relativism denies that any
value or norm is universal in this transcendental sense. Crude relativism cannot,
therefore, invoke the principle of non-coercion to substantiate its "imperialist"
challenge to the universality of human rights. See infra text accompanying notes 199.
203.

20011

UNIVERSALITY OF INTERNATIONAL H UMAN RIGHTS

537

Part IV therefore strives to defend the liberal foundations that
form the core of universal human rights. This Part argues that crude
cultural relativism in fact invokes-and, absent some presently
unarticulated alternative, must invoke-the liberal values of
reasonable tolerance and autonomy in any attempt to repudiate
international human rights law.
But these values cannot be
selectively adopted. A state's elite cannot, for example, appeal to the
liberal values of reasonable tolerance and autonomy to challenge
universal human rights law as "imperialistic"--for failing to extend
adequate tolerance to cultural diversity-but then conveniently reject
these very same values when individuals within their polity invoke
them in the form of human rights claims.
Arguably, this inconsistency can be reconciled. In the former
case, it seems, the reference is to the reasonable tolerance owed to
groups and to cultural autonomy; in the latter, to individuals and to
personal autonomy. Perhaps, then, the former claim need not imply
the latter. But Part IV argues that this apparent distinction rests on
a mistake: The justification for valuing tolerance and autonomy, as
Will Kymlicka has convincingly shown, 22 is inextricably tied to the
distinctive liberal conception of the individual or the "self' as agent.
Consequently, absent some alternative-non-liberal--justification,
any assertion that cultural groups or political entities also merit
tolerance and respect for their autonomy is necessarily derivative ofnot independent of-the rationale for respecting individual autonomy.
Of course, a cultural or state elite remains free to repudiate this value
and its concomitant rationale. But it cannot then demand tolerance
or respect for "cultural autonomy" as a rhetorical device to deflect
criticism of its human rights practices. By contrast, to embrace the
values of autonomy and reasonable tolerance is to acknowledge the
normative force of universal human rights.
Moreover, because the liberal values that find expression in
international human rights law do respect the paramount importance
of reasonable tolerance and autonomy, "universal" human rights law
proves highly inclusive, accommodating, and tolerant of the diversity
of cultural traditions and values that comprise the contemporary
international community. This is because international human
rights law evolved from a tradition that, far from denying alternative,
"culturally relative" conceptions of value, emphasizes the liberal
presumption of value pluralism.
Finally, the Article concludes by integrating the above
arguments with an idea that Jack Donnelly, Rhoda Howard, and
other scholars have advanced.
Specifically, the normative
universality of human rights must be conceived in the context of a

22.

See KYMLICKA, supra note 4, at 152-65.
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historically contingent, but no less valid empirical truth:
The
Western nation-state-and its attendant cultural narratives-has
become the principal actor in international law. Human rights,
which developed precisely to counterbalance, as Cover writes, "the
rise of the national state with its almost unique mastery of violence
over extensive territories," 23 is, consequently, the peculiarly
appropriate set of norms to govern contemporary international law.
Universal human rights, then, constitute the appropriate concept for
responding to abuses by states and state-like actors, such as
paramilitary groups, tribal, or other informal authorities. This may
imply that other deeply troubling concerns should not be conceived,
strictly speaking, as universal human rights violations. This does not
detract from the value or validity of universal human rights law. It
simply clarifies, not surprisingly, that human rights ought not to be
understood as a panacea for all human suffering or as the exclusive
mechanism for promoting a world community conducive to human
dignity.

II. UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CHALLENGE
OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM
"Human rights" lends itself to multiple rhetorical uses. Like
"justice," 'liberty," and "equality," the term "human rights" is used to
support broad claims and diverse demands. To analyze cultural
relativism, however, two basic meanings must be distinguished.
First, human rights may be understood philosophically, as the rights
that human beings, qua human, possess. In this respect Holmes'
dictum that where there is no remedy there is no right must be
rejected. 24 It would remain perfectly coherent to suggest that one's
human rights had been violated, even if no institution existed to

23.
Robert Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudenceof the Social Order, 5 J.
L. & RELIGION 65 (1987), reprinted in STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 6, at 181, 183.
Jack Donnelly and Rhoda Howard's writings have championed this strand of this
Article's argument. After surveying non-Western cultural analogues that appear to
promote human dignity, Donnelly concludes, "Why were there no human rights in
traditional non-Western and Western societies? Because prior to the creation of
capitalist market economies and modern nation states, the problems that human rights
seek to address, the particular violations of human dignity that they seek to prevent,
either did not exist or were not widely perceived to be central social problems."
DONNELLY, supra note 5, at 64.
24.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 169 (Mark DeWolfe Howe
ed., 1963) (1881) ("A legal right is nothing but a permission to exercise certain natural
powers, and upon certain conditions to obtain protection, restitution, or compensation
by the aid of the public force. Just so far as the aid of the public force is given a man,
he has a legal right, and this right is the same whether his claim is founded in
righteousness or iniquity.').
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provide legal redress. As Donnelly clarifies, "Possessionof a right, the
respect it receives, and the ease or frequency of enforcement" are quite
separate issues.2 5 Needless to say, the mere fact that some human
rights are not respected or are inadequately enforced does not, ipso
facto, refute their universal possession by human beings. To the
contrary, were human rights universally enjoyed, we would have no
need for them. 26 Second, we might understand human rights in a
strictly legal sense: Human rights would then comprise a particular
subset of the domain of legal claims that individuals-and arguably,
at times, communities 2 7-can advance.
In this regard, if no
institution exists that, at least in theory, could provide a remedy, no
28
legal human right exists.
Some leading proponents of cultural relativism advocate
revisions to the UDHR and post-World War II human rights
treaties. 29 Yet the critical issue raised by relativist critiques
implicates human rights in the philosophical sense: human rights as
weighty, often preemptive, cultural values. 30 Cultural relativists do
not typically claim that international treaties lack legal validity

25.
DONNELLY, supra note 5, at 11-12.
26.
Donnelly refers to this state of affairs-where an individual has a right but
does not enjoy the object of that right-as the "possession paradox," and he observes
that "[h]aving' a right is therefore of most value precisely when one does not 'have' the
object of the right.. .Y Id. at 11.
27.
See generally KYMLICKA, supra note 4, at 35-44 (arguing that certain forms
of "group-differentiated rights"-namely, "external protections," which insulate a
minority people from some consequences of majority rule, as opposed to "internal
restrictions," whereby a group limits the rights of its individual members in the service
of group solidarity or cultural survival-remain compatible with the fundamental
commitments of a liberal society).
28.
Legal institutions must exist that, in theory, would recognize a human
rights claim as legitimate grounds for remedial action, even if,in practice, these
institutions are corrupt, inefficient, or otherwise unable to effectuate this species of
legal claim. On October 5, 1998, the People's Republic of China signed the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA. Res. 2200A. U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR]. Should China subsequently ratify the ICCPR, it would become perfectly
coherent to assert that a Chinese dissident's legal human rights had been violated,
even if, as it unfortunately appears, China's present legal institutions frequently act to
subvert the ICCPR's intended due process guarantees. Sce generally BUREAU OF
DMiOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEPVt OF STATE, CHINA COUNirRY REPORT
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1999 (2000), auailableat httpJ/wAww,.state.gov/g/drll
rlsthrrpt/1999.
29.
Gillian Triggs, Confucius and Consensus: InternationalLow in the Asian
Pacific,21 MELB. U. L. REV. 650, 668-69 (1997).
30.
The value debate, of course, at times collapses into a legal debate. As
narrative relativism indicates, governments may conclude human rights treaties, and
yet, when it comes to practice or implementation, the terms of these treaties may
possess vastly different meanings in virtue of their divergent cultural contexts. But
properly understood, this challenge, too, is not a legal claim. Two states may agree
that the right to free speech articulated by article 19 of the ICCPR must be respected.
The dispute persists over what values a "right to free speech" legitimately protects.
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because they interfere with sacrosanct cultural traditions. They
assert, instead, that the values codified in these treaties and the
functional concepts used to enforce them (rights) either (1) impose a
value hegemony anathema to their cultural traditions (crude
relativism); or (2) often receive interpretations informed by cultural
biases that fail to acknowledge alternative, but equally valid, cultural
constructions of these legally codified principles (narrative
3
relativism).
Before evaluating these critiques, then, the conceptual
framework under attack-roughly, Western liberalism and its
concomitant concern with rights-warrants preliminary appraisal.
Liberalism does not denote a single, clearly identifiable tradition; to
the contrary, "right-wing" libertarians, "left-wing" proponents of a
vigorous welfare state, and every permutation along the political
spectrum in between at times self-identifies as, or is saddled by
others with the description "liberal." Liberalism must not, therefore,
be understood as a monolithic approach to political philosophy. 32 Yet
several prominent features ascribed to the Western liberal tradition
can be identified that different variants of the cultural relativist
critique challenge: the primacy of the individual as the fundamental
unit of concern and measure of value; a conception of rights as
political "trumps"'3 3 against the demands of the state or community; a
commitment to some measure of democratic participation in
government; a concern with preserving autonomy; and finally, some
notion of equality.
But even conceding, for the moment, that most forms of Western
liberalism embrace these ideas in one way or another, we must take
care not to make any simple equation between the human rights
movement and Western liberalism. First, international human rights
did not develop as an identifiable movement until after World War II;
whereas liberalism, in its diverse manifestations, claims a much
longer history. Second, although human rights evolved from values
and philosophical presumptions closely associated with the Western

31.
For example, some Native American tribes in Canada expressly endorse the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Tribal leaders remain concerned, however,
"that white judges will impose their own culturally specific form of democracy, without
considering whether traditional Indian practices are an equally valid interpretation of
democratic principles ....
They endorse the principles, but object to the particular
institutions and procedures that the larger society has established to enforce these
principles." KYMLICKA, supra note 4, at 39-40.
32.
At the same time, liberal traditions arguably share certain basic precepts.
David Johnston suggests that liberal political theories invariably endorse three tenets:
(1) only individuals count; (2) everybody counts as one, nobody as more than one; and
(3) everybody counts as an agent-a being capable of independently conceiving of and
subsequently pursuing personal goals.

DAVID JOHNSTON, THE IDEA OF A LIBERAL

THEORY 17-27 (1994).
33.
See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1979).

2001)

UNIVERSALITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

541

liberal tradition, the modern international human rights movement
can embrace certain other substantive cultural values to the extent
that they promote human dignity. Finally, no necessary connection
exists between being a political liberal and respecting all
international human rights. 34
Some liberals-including selfidentified human rights advocates-reject economic, social, and
cultural rights, half of the so-called "Universal Bill of Human Rights,"
as genuine rights.35 Other liberals-those in the Benthamite
utilitarian tradition for example-might regard international human
rights as "nonsense on stilts"--though they might be inclined to
concede the usefulness of this nonsense. 36 Still others might express
support for international human rights while maintaining a deep
commitment to Marxist political theory.
Yet we need not engage these debates directly to evaluate
cultural relativism. What is at stake is not which liberal values
deserve to be included on the substantive "list" of human rights. The
crux of the question presented by relativism resides at a distinct
level: Does acknowledging the descriptive truth of cultural pluralism
require abandoning the idea that human rights-however politicians,
international lawyers, philosophers, and others delimit their scopecan, in any meaningful sense, be universal? Does cultural pluralism
show that the very objective of international human rights law-to
establish rights that operate erga omnes partes despite the disparate
cultural and political contingencies that characterize different nationstates-is incoherent? Thus, the next section identifies some of the
more prominent features of the Western human rights movement as
it has developed, philosophically and historically, in the liberal
tradition, and subsequently considers whether the descriptive fact of
cultural pluralism renders the normative concept of universal human
rights misguided.
A. UniversalHuman Rights in the Western Liberal Tradition:
PhilosophicalAntecedents
These qualifications aside, the human rights tradition remains
quintessentially a legacy of Western liberalism.
It owes its
conceptual origins to a unique Enlightenment-era synthesis of two

This is not to say that there is not, in fact, a connection between liberalism
34.
and international human rights. See DONNELLY, supra note 5, at 67 (asserting that
"[i]nternationally recognized human rights require a liberal regime). Donnelly
argues-rightly, in the Author's judgment-that realizing the list of human rights
sketched by the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR requires, broadly speaking, some form of
liberal state. The point here is simply that, for analytic purposes, the two should not be
identified or equated in an overly simplified fashion.
35.
36.

E.g., ROBERT NOZIcK, ANARCHY, STATE & UTOPIA (1971).
JEREMY BENTHAM, ANARCHICAL FALLAcIES 489, 501 (1824).
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prominent schools of Western philosophy: natural law and natural
rights. 37 The former, which dates to ancient Greek and Hebraic
traditions, locates universal moral principles in the order of nature.
Aristotle wrote, for instance, that "[o]f political justice part is natural,
part legal-natural,that which everywhere has the same force and
does not exist by people's thinking this or that.''3 8 The idea that
certain moral laws exist independently of the human mind because
they inhere in the natural order of the universe persisted into the
middle ages, at which time Aquinas, among others, linked this notion
of natural law to conceptions of a divine will. 39 "[lilt was the fusion of
the mythopoeic view that moral values are built into the natural
order of things with the doctrine of the immanent operation of
divinely revealed moral laws that led to the theory of natural law."40
Natural law theory thus postulates that certain norms of conduct
possess a non-contingent ontological status in virtue of which they
transcend the ephemeral features of particular cultures and historical
epochs.

Although frequently conflated with natural rights, natural law
theory, by itself, provides an insufficient basis for individual claimswhether moral or legal; it includes no necessary connection to the
human subject. 'The natural law idiom," Thomas Pogge clarifies,
"need not involve constraints on one's conduct toward other subjects
at all, and even if it does, need not involve the idea that by violating
such constraints, one has wronged these subjects-one may rather
have wronged God, for example, or disturbed the harmonious order of
the cosmos. '41 Natural rights, by contrast, introduce the human
subject as rights-holder, effecting a crucial shift in the locus of
universality: from "nature" or "divinity" to '"human." Natural rights
theorists, including Enlightenment-era luminaries like Rousseau and
Locke, commonly posit, whether as an alleged historical fact or a
mere theoretical postulate, a state of nature in which humans enjoy
certain rights. 42 These natural rights, the familiar story runs, are

37.

See Pogge, supra note 5, at 1.

38.

ARISTOTLE,

NICHOMACHEAN

ETHICS,

reprinted in

BASIC

WORKS

OF

ARISTOTLE 1014 (Richard McKeon ed. & W.D. Ross trans., 1941) (emphasis added).
39.
See DONNELLY, supra note 8, at 45-47.
40.
David Sidorsky, Contemporary Reinterpretationsof the Concept of Human
Rights, in ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND JEWISH
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 91; see also MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN
RIGHTS & WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 68 (1980).

41.
Pogge, supranote 5, at 2.
42.
See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8-14 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1980) (1690); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU,
DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY, in THE BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS (Donald

A. Cress trans. & ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1987) (1754). The source and content of
these rights vary among natural rights theorists. Some, like Locke, continue to locate
natural rights in the divine will: the rights to life, liberty, and property, according to
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then collectively traded by individuals to a state in exchange for some
form of security.
A strong nexus exists between natural law and natural rights
theories, but the pedigree of human rights resides largely in the shift
from the former to the latter. 43 First and foremost, this shift created
a class of rights-holders-human beings-empowered to press claims.
'To have a right to x," as Donnelly puts it, "is to be specially entitled
'44
to have and enjoy x."
Second, the shift from natural law to natural
rights reoriented the locus of universality-from an external focus on
the nature of the universe to an internal focus on the nature of
humans:
The adjective "human"-unlike "natural"-does not suggest an
ontological status independent of any and all human efforts, decisions
and (re)cognition. It does not rule out such a status either. Rather, it
avoids these metaphysical and metaethical issues by implying nothing
45
about them one way or the other.

Critically, then, while rights theories frequently evolved from
ontological claims-about God or nature-they need not, unlike
natural law theory, remain committed to these transcendentalist
ideas. Finally, by postulating a contractual relationship between the
individual-as-rights-holder and the state, natural rights theory laid
the foundation for understanding human rights violations as
46
implying official abuse.
Human rights, in sum, imply three interrelated postulates: (1)
They are "held" by a certain class of rights-holders who may
"exercise" them or press them as claims upon other agents or
institutions; (2) this class includes all and only human beings, qua
human-only humans hold these rights because only humans possess
the requisite qualities 47 that make human rights conceptually
meaningful; and (3) unlike natural rights generally, susceptible to
both public and private violation, only official abuses-those
committed, at a minimum, under color of state or communal

Locke, existed in the state of nature at the time of man's fall from grace. Locke, supra,
at 9. Hobbes, by contrast, merely ascribes to man the right to defend his person, "the
liberty that each man hath, to use his own power as he vill himself, for the
preservation of his own nature." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 103 (Michael Oakshott
ed., 1962) (1651).
43.
E.g., ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 93; Pogge, supra note 5,

at 3-4.
DONNELLY, supra note 5, at 9.
45.
Pogge, supranote 5, at 2-3.
46.
See id.
47.
These qualities could be metaphysical-all humans possess a divine
nature-or "merely" contingent-only humans, as moral beings, possess the relevant
capacities-free will and agency, that make rights meaningful.
44.
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authority-count as human rights violations. 48 From the standpoint
of the history of philosophy, then, the universality of human rights
resides in either transcendental features of the natural world, or
alternatively, in some essential, peculiar features of human beings,
qua human.
B. Universal Human Rights in the Western Liberal
Tradition: HistoricalAntecedents
From a political-historical perspective, universal human rights
emerged in the wake of World War II.
The unique atmosphere
prevailing in the post-World War II era, shaped, in particular, by
reactions to the atrocities of Nazi Germany, facilitated the
extraordinarily rapid success and expansion of the international
human rights movement. Indeed, as Louis Henkin observed, only
these circumstances made the "creation and adoption [of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights] without dissent" possible; it
embodied one of the "marvels of postwar international life. ' 49 Yet the
post-WWII instantiation of human rights in multilateral treaties and
declarations 50 represented the merger, expansion, and modification of
several trends in international law that predate the birth of the
human rights movement.
Steiner and Alston cite four core
precedents: first, the laws of war-international humanitarian law;
second, the protection afforded aliens by international law, which at
times motivated state "humanitarian intervention" to protect
nationals residing in foreign states; third, the attribution of
individual criminal liability to Nazi war criminals; and fourth, the

48.
Thomas Pogge provides the following example: if a street thug steals my
car, my rights have been violated. But we would not describe this situation as a
human rights abuse. By contrast, the arbitrary confiscation of my car by the
government might appropriately be called a human rights violation. See Pogge, supra
note 5, at 4.
49.
Louis Henkin, Human Rights: Reappraisaland Readjustment, in ESSAYS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 69.
50.
E.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, G.A. Res. 260A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 179th Plen. Mtg. (1948),
reprinted in 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A,
supra note 14, at 71; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52 (1976), reprinted in
999 U.N.T.S. 302; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1976), reprinted in 999 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res.
39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, annex, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984),
reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), modified in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985).
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development of minority rights treaty regimes to protect national
minorities during the League of Nations era.5 1
To appreciate the significance of minority rights regimes in the
context of the relativist-universalist debate, two ideologies must be
distinguished. Value pluralism, the proposition that, within a
political community, individual citizens will inevitably disagree about
the fundamental goals of life,5 2 must be distinguished from cultural
pluralism, the coexistence within a polity of two or more distinct
peoples, where a people signifies "an intergenerational community,
more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or
homeland, sharing a distinct language and history."5 3 The former
concept, though not so-called, informed the political thought of
classical liberals such as John Stuart Mill.54 It also motivated the
concern with factions that preoccupied some of the drafters of the
U.S. Constitution. Madison, for instance, remarked that "[t]he latent
causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man ....
A zeal for
different opinions concerning religion, concerning Government and
many other points . . . ."55 In general, liberals do not deny the fact of
value pluralism; to the contrary, a great deal of Western political
thought invokes value pluralism as the basic problem that motivates
some emphasis on individual rights.
But the historical relationship between liberalism and cultural
pluralism is ambiguous.
Kymlicka argues forcefully that the
contemporary notion that states should treat cultures within their
territorial boundaries with "benign neglect" is comparatively recent.5 6
Historically, far from endorsing the idea that "the state should treat
cultural membership as a purely private matter,"5 7 Western liberals
were attentive to the problems posed by cultural pluralism-not least
of which was that its existence threatened the political stability of

51.
For an overview of these antecedents, see STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 6.
at 59-116.
52.
The fact of value pluralism, famously elaborated by Isaiah Berlin in his
seminal essay Two Concepts of Liberty, is often deemed a fundamental tenet of
liberalism. Simply stated, value pluralism is the claim that individuals disagree, and
will inevitably disagree, about which ultimate values merit pursuit. Recognition of this
social fact, in turn, requires a state that, at a minimum, establishes an inalienable
sphere of action within which individuals-provided they refrain from infringing the
liberty of others-may pursue their particular projects and ends without fear of
coercive interference by other individuals or the state. See Isaiah Berlin. Two Concepts
of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-72 (1969).
53.
KYMLICKA, supranote 4, at 18.
54.
E.g., J.S. MULL, ON LIBERTY 12 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publishing
Co. 1978) (1859) ("The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our
own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of thewrs or
impede their efforts to obtain it.").

55.
56.
57.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 58 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
KYMLICKA, supranote 4, at 50.
Id. at 53.
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nation-states. This concern, which first emerged in the seventeenth
century when certain religious minorities were afforded interstate
protection,5 8 grew more prominent in the nineteenth-century due to
the predominance of multination-the Hapsburg, Ottoman and
Russian tsarist-and colonial empires-Great Britain and France:
It was commonplace in nineteenth-century thought to distinguish the
'great nations', such as France, Italy, Poland, Germany, Hungary,
Spain, England, and Russia, from smaller 'nationalities', such as the
Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Basques, Welsh, Scots, Serbians, Bulgarians,
Romanians, and Slovenes. The great nations were seen as civilized...
59
the carriers of historical development.

Needless to say, a similar relationship obtained between the
European colonial powers and the diverse peoples of Asia, Africa, and
the Middle East that suffered colonization during and prior to the
mid-twentieth century. 60 According to Kymlicka, liberals responded
to the related difficulties raised by multination empires and
colonization in one of two ways: Either they advocated coercive
assimilation of the subjugated nationality or colonized people, or they
endorsed the idea of certain protections for minority cultures
subsumed by these empires. 61 Pre-twentieth-century liberals did not,
however, advance the view that states should ignore cultural
membership as an irrelevant, "incidental" feature; rather, "liberals
either endorsed the legal recognition of minority cultures, or rejected
minority rights not because they rejected the idea of an official
culture, but precisely because they believed there should be one
official culture. ' 62 It was only after World War II that the idea that
states should treat cultural disparities with "benign neglect"6 3-that
the state's exclusive concern ought to be with treatment of the
individual human subject, qua human-became the predominant
64
approach in liberal political thought.
Thus, in the aftermath of World War I-with the collapse of the
multination Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and the
upheaval wrought by the Bolshevik revolution-the League of
Nations sought to create regimes for the protection of cultural
minorities by imposing 'Minorities Treaties . . . on the new or

58.
See Elizabeth F. Defeis, Minority Protections and BilateralAgreements: An
Effective Mechanism, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 291, 293 (1999) (observing

that religious minorities, after the Peace of Westphalia, were the first to receive
international protection through the peace treaties of Munster and Osnabruck
concluded between France, the Holy Roman Empire and their respective allies).
59.
KYMLICKA, supra note 4, at 53.
60.
61.

See generally ALBERT MEMMI, THE COLONIZER & THE COLONIZED (1965).
See KYMLICKA, supra note 4, at 50-57.

62.

Id. at 53-54.

63.
Kymlicka borrows this phrase from NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE
DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 25 (1975). Id. at 3.
64.
Id. at 49-50.
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reconfigured states of Central-East Europe and the Balkans." 65 Far
from ignoring cultural membership, these treaties-influenced in no
small part by Woodrow Wilson's emphasis on the "self-determination
The newly
precisely the opposite:
of peoples"66-demanded
constituted governments were compelled to guarantee certain groupdifferentiated rights-language, religion, and education-to minority
cultures subsisting within nation-states dominated by other, majority
nationalities. In its advisory opinion on Minority Schools in Albania,
for example, the Permanent Court of International Justice rejected
the Albanian Government's position that the Albanian Declaration
required only that it "grant to its nationals belonging to racial,
religious or linguistic minorities a right equal to that possessed by
other Albanian nationals."6 7 To the contrary, the Permanent Court of
International Justice (P.C.I.J.) held:
The idea underlying the treaties for the protection of minorities is to

secure for certain elements incorporated in a State, the population of
which differs from them in race, language or religion, the possibility of
living peaceably alongside that population and co-operating amicably
with it, while at the same time preserving the characteristics which
distinguish them from the majority, and satisfying the ensuing special
needs.

68

Here again, consistent with Kymlicka's argument, cultural
pluralism receives acknowledgment and appears to require some
forms of differential treatment of cultural groups to ensure their
protection against the politically predominant culture. Liberalism's
purported fixation on the decontextualized individual to the exclusion
of certain potential cultural rights and values thus proves less an
essential feature of liberalism than of post-War developments in
liberal thought-developments that in substantial part motivated the
rhetoric of universality that permeates subsequent human rights
instruments.

STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 6. at 88.
65.
66.
E.g., Speech of Woodrow Wilson (Feb. 11, 1918). reprinted in 1 THE PUBIC
PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON: WAR & RACE 180 (R. Baker & W. Dodd eds., 1927). See
generally Michla Pomerance, The United States and Self-Deterrinnation: Perspectives
of the Wilsonian Conception, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1976).
Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64 (Apr. 6).
67.
reprinted in STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 6, at 90.
STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 6, at 91; see also Certain Questions Relating
68.
to Settlers of German Origin in the Territory Ceded by Germany to Poland, 1923
P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 6 (Sept. 10); Certain Questions Arising out of the Application of
Article 4 of the Polish Minorities Treaty, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 7 (Sept. 15).
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C. The Genesis of "Universal"InternationalHuman Rights

It is not immediately apparent, then, why "universality," though
by no means novel to the Western rights tradition, 6 9 assumed such
prominence in the post-War international public order. Nor is it
apparent why concern with ethno-cultural differences and the
insulation of minority rights more or less dropped out of the picture
after World War II. Several factors, however, help to explain this
theoretical shift. First, as Rita Hauser notes:
[The] universal approach, which looks beyond the boundaries of the
sovereign state, was the result both of the horror of the Western world
at the scope of Hitler's atrocities and the determined lobbying of
interested organizations which made their views known long before San
Francisco was selected as the Charter drafting site. Numerous Jewish
groups, in particular, promoted the idea of an International Bill of
Rights, believing, as they did, that Jews would be protected in the
enjoyment of their rights to the extent the rights of others everywhere
70
were similarly respected.

But universality owed its theoretical appeal to more than the desire
to affirm certain inalienable rights of man after the horrors of Nazi
Germany. It also reflected an acknowledgment that the culturallybased minority rights regimes had failed catastrophically. While
these treaty-based rights for the protection of ethno-cultural
minorities enjoyed some early successes, Hitler later exploited their
existence to vindicate German aggression in the late 1930s. "[T]he
issue of German minorities in Poland and Czechoslovakia became a
significant, albeit pretextual, precipitating factor for German
aggression and World War II. '' 71 Consequently, in the aftermath of
World War II, the idea of human rights, as inalienable and
undifferentiated rights that attach to the individual without regard to
cultural identity, found widespread support. Cultural rights were
"subsum[ed] . . . under the broader problem of ensuring basic

individual rights to all human beings, without reference to
membership in ethnic groups. ' 72 Universality, then, developed as
both a positive affirmation of the naturalistic idea of the inherent
"rights of man" after the atrocities of Nazi Germany, as well as a
negative reaction against the apparent failure of minority-rights
regimes created during the League of Nations era.

69.
See generally The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776); French
Declaration on the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789).
70.
Rita Hauser, InternationalHuman-Rights Protection: The Dream and the
Deceptions, in ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 22.
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Yet the drafters of the UDHR were not blind to the highly
precarious empirical status of universal human rights.
First,
philosophical skepticism about universal rights and natural law
enjoys a history as rich as the traditions out of which the contrary
ideals developed. Against the Aristotelian natural law tradition of
ancient Greece, for instance, stood the moral and cognitive skepticism
of the pre-Socratic sophists, famously expressed in the Protagorean
maxim that "man is the measure of all things."7 3 Liberalism itself
embraces not only natural law and natural rights traditions, but also
utilitarianism, whose founder, Jeremy Bentham, famously mocked
natural rights as mere "nonsense upon stilts.

'7 4

Contemporary rights

skeptics, such as Alasdair MacIntyre, echo this complaint, equating
human rights with "belief in witches and in unicorns;" he proceeds to
quip that:
[In the United Nations declaration on human rights in 1949 what has
since become the normal UN practice of not giving good reasons for any
assertions whatsoever is followed with great rigor. And the latest
defender of such rights, Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously,
1976), concedes that the existence of such rights cannot be
demonstrated, but remarks on this point simply that it does not follow
from the fact that a statement cannot be demonstrated that it is not
true (p. 81). Which is true, but could equally be used to defend claims
about unicorns and witches. Natural or human rights then are
75
fictions ....

But the problem of forging a list of 'universar' rights that confronted
the drafters of the UDHR was not only-nor primarily-theoretical.
It was magnified and exacerbated both by the number of cultures
represented at the United Nations and by the ideological split
between the Western allies and the Soviet bloc. Thus, at the time of
the UDHR's drafting, as Mary Ann Glendon wrote recently in her
commemorative analysis, "the problem of universality loomed
large... ",76
In 1947, in an effort to lay the groundwork for the drafting of a
universal declaration of human rights, the UN Economic and Social
Council (UNESCO) circulated a questionnaire to prominent scholars
and cultural figures worldwide, requesting their views on the extent,
nature, and theoretical grounds of human rights. 77 Responses to the
questionnaire, as expected, reflected divergent cultural and
ideological perspectives; nonetheless, "[t]o the Committee's surprise,
73.
74.

See RELATIVISM: COGNITIVE & MORAL, supra note 10, at 6.
BENTHAM1, supranote 36, at 489, 501.
75.
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 69-70 (2d ed. 1984).
76
Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declarationof Human Rights,
73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1155 (1998).
77.
Memorandum and Questionnaire Circulated by UNESCO on the
Theoretical Bases of the Rights of Man, reprintedin HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1. app.
I,at 251.

550

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:527

the lists of basic rights and values they received from their far-flung
sources were essentially similar. [Committee Rapporteur] McKeon's
final report recorded their conclusion that it was indeed possible to
achieve agreement across cultures concerning certain rights that
'may be viewed as implicit in man's nature as an individual and as a
member of society.' 78 Yet this consensus, as the Committee readily
acknowledged, was tenuous at best, a superficial agreement upon
nominal "rights" that masked deep, intractable disagreements
regarding their rationale, meaning, and application.7 9 Jacques
Maritain, French philosopher and member of the UNESCO
Committee, noted that no consensus proved possible on what he
termed a common "speculative ideology," but that, nonetheless, "we
find [principles] that . . .constitute grosso modo a sort of common
denominator, a sort of unwritten common law, at the point where in
practice the most widely separated theoretical ideologies and mental
80
traditions converge."
Yet even Maritain's carefully qualified language overstates the
degree of this consensus. What the Committee managed to procure
for the Human Rights Commission that drafted the UDHR amounted
to little more than a short list articulated at a level of generality that
rendered the terms susceptible to, not merely different, but at times
wholly antithetical interpretations. The Committee concluded, for
instance, that "[e]very man has an equal right to justice,"8 1 without,
however, providing any definitional content to this notoriously
controversial ideal. Indeed, the vacuity of this "universal right"
becomes amusingly apparent in a sentence that shortly follows, which
stipulates tautologically that every man has a "right to be protected
by law from illegal arrest. '8 2

Likewise, the Committee included,

under the heading of a "Right to Political Action," the freedom to
express ideas and to form associations "provided that such
expressions and such associations are not incompatible with the
principles of democracy or with the rights of man. '8 3 Here again, the

qualifier eviscerates any content that such a right might prima facie
appear to bestow. John L. Lewis, for example, one of the respondents
to the Committee's survey, affirmed the right to democratic
association but noted that it requires eradication of "those sections of
the community whose interests unquestionably conflict with those of

78.
Glendon, supra note 76, at 1155-56 (quoting Richard McKeon, The
PhilosophicBases and Material Circumstancesof the Rights of Man, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 1, at 45).
79.
See Glendon, supra note 76, at 1156-67.
80.
Jacques Maritain, supra note 1, at 10.
81.
The Grounds of an InternationalDeclarationof Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 1, app. II, at 270.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
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the community [and] are inconsistent with democratic purposes and
therefore implacably hostile to real democracy ...
The crisis can
only be solved with full democracy; that is, with the final release of
popular power to control economic resources and to accomplish
human ends."84 Whatever the merits of Lewis' remarks, this
definition of democracy would hardly resonate with most Western
liberal understandings of the word.
Given the constitutional makeup of the United Nations in the
immediate post-War era, it is unsurprising that the deepest
ideological rift that emerged reflected the antithetical ideologies of,
broadly speaking, liberal democracies and communist states-joined
by their respective spheres of influence. Respondents thus repeatedly
affirmed the importance of liberty as a basic human right but
expressed radically different views about the circumstances under
which liberty truly exists. Members of the Soviet bloc emphasized
that genuine liberty requires man to be in full control of his economic
and social circumstances, free from capitalist exploitation,8 5 while
Western liberals tended to emphasize the extent to which liberty
demands limits on state action. 86 The UNESCO Committee was not,
of course, unaware of these tensions nor of the precarious nature of
the alleged consensus it had achieved. The Committee's chairman,
Professor Richard McKeon, concluded that:
The fundamental problem is not found in compiling a list of human
rights . . . [Ihe declarations that have been submitted to the
Commission on Human Rights are surprisingly similar . . . . [The
differences are found rather in what is meant by these rights, and these
differences of meaning depend on divergent basic assumptions, which,
in turn, lend plausibility to and are justified by contradictory
interpretations of the economic and social situation, and, finally, lead to
opposed recommendations concerning the implementation requred for
87
a world declaration of human rights.

The Committee's final report to the Human Rights Commission
conceded as much. 88 Yet it suggested, somewhat paradoxically, that
the problem faced in drafting a universal declaration of human rights
resides not in "doctrinal consensus" but merely in consensus
"concerning rights, and also concerning action in the realisation and
defence of those rights, which may be justified on highly divergent

84.
John Lewis, On Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1. at 68-69.
85
See id. at 61.
86
See id. at 63.
87.
Richard McKeon, The PhilosophicBases and MaterialCircumstances of the
Rights of Man, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 35.
88.
See THE GROUNDS OF AN INTERNATIONAL DECLARATION OF HUMtAN RIGHTS,
in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, app. II, at 263 (emphasizing that the Committee is
"fully aware that these working definitions are susceptible of lughly diverse
particularisations").
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grounds." 89 If we interpret this statement charitably, as merely
expressing the conditions under which the drafting of the UDHR's
language is a feasible project, then it retains some plausibility.
Yet the suggestion that "action in the realisation and defence of
those rights" 90 might also proceed from such a consensus remains
dubious. This difficulty achieving consensus, moreover, increases
exponentially when we recognize that, since the adoption of the
UDHR in 1948, the membership of the United Nations has increased
from 56 to 185 states. 91 The United Nations today embraces societies
that manifest cultural divergences potentially far more varied and
severe than the already intractable Cold War ideological rift that
preoccupied the drafters. Indeed, despite the rhetoric of universality,
interdivisibility, and interdependency, which forty-five years later
found its way into the Vienna Declaration, the actual 1993
Conference revealed similarly profound disagreements regarding the
nature, interpretation, and priority of human rights.92 In short,
genuine consensus sufficient to be termed "universal"-now, as in
1948-exists, if at all, only at a level of rhetorical and linguistic
abstraction that provides little guidance as to the practical
implementation of human rights.
D. Alternative Conceptions of the Locus of Universality
In 1947 the American Anthropological Association, which was
likewise consulted by the Human Rights Commission prior to the
UDHR's drafting, affirmed, almost unequivocally, the descriptive fact
of cultural relativism: "Standards and values are relative to the
culture from which they derive so that any attempt to formulate
postulates that grow out of the beliefs or moral codes of one culture
must to that extent detract from the applicability of any Declaration
of Human Rights to mankind as a whole. '93 Since then, of course, the
international community has undergone and continues to experience
what has been termed "globalization." The exponential increase in
technology, particularly methods of communication, has facilitated a
remarkable growth in economic and cultural exchanges between
states, 94 and it seems logical to assume that this increase in cultural
exchange promotes an attendant increase in shared values. To some

89.
90.

Id.
Id.

See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 6, at 120.
See HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 195-96.
93.
American Anthropological Association, Statement on Human Rights, 49
AMER. ANTHROPOLOGIST 539 (1947), reprinted in STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 6, at
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E.g., Jeffrey D. Sachs, Globalization and the Rule of Law (Yale Law School
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extent, and in certain spheres more than others-economics, for
example-there is undoubtedly a degree of truth to this presumption.

Yet, perhaps paradoxically, we have witnessed more, not fewer,
assertions of cultural and ethnic identification in the post-World War
II era, particularly since the end of the Cold War.
Francis
Fukuyama's "end of history" 95-brought about by a "universalization
96
of Western liberal democracy"-has decisively failed to materialize.
To the contrary, "[m]odern societies are increasingly confronted with
minority groups demanding recognition of their identity, and
accommodation of their cultural differences. ' 97 Even more troubling
from the perspective of "universal human rights," these cherished
assertions of cultural distinction appear to have at least contributed
to, or even played a significant causal role in, some of the most
egregious human rights catastrophes since World War II. The hope
that global interdependence itself would impel a new era of universal
adherence to international human rights norms now seems quixotic.
Empirically, then, the universality of human rights-where
"universal" denotes a high degree of consensus among the cultures
and nation-states that comprise the international communityemerges as, at best, a useful fiction. "Cultural relativity," as even
proponent of universality Jack Donnelly acknowledges, "is an
undeniable fact; moral rules and social institutions evidence an
astonishing cultural and historical variability." 98 Yet the normative
universality of human rights need not be based on empirical claims
about an actual cultural consensus, although it seems apparent that
the existence of such a consensus would provide some of the strongest
prima facie support for a claim to universality. Universal human
rights could be vindicated on several alternative grounds that bear
appraisal before examining what consequences flow from
acknowledging the descriptive truth of cultural pluralism.
1. The Human Needs Approach
Intuitively, as Donnelly notes, "[h]uman rights are... the rights
one has simply because one is a human being."9 9 An initially
attractive approach, then, would be to locate the source of
universality in that which remains definitionally human about us-in
natural facts about human beings that do not vary from culture to
culture. Thus, one might assert that our need for nutritional

95.

See generally FRANcIs FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HIsTORY AND THE LAST MAN

(1992).
96.
97.
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See HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 31.
KYMLICKA, supranote 4, at 10.
DONNELLY, supranote 5, at 109.

99.

Id. at 9.

554

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

IVOL. 34:527

sustenance gives rise to a "right to food" and that our need for
security gives rise to a "right to physical integrity," which may, in
turn, generate certain negative rights, such as the prohibition against
torture. Depending upon how much elasticity we permit the term
"need" to assume, one might also suggest that all human beings
evince a need for what Rawls refers to as the social bases of selfrespect, 0 0 those traits that permit us to sustain a level of
psychological as well as physical health within the context of a
cultural community. Rights against enslavement, due process rights,
anti-discrimination rights, and others might thereby be drawn within
the domain of human rights. Postulating a need for the "social bases
of self-respect" disturbs the relatively concrete notion of biological
need from which this conception of universal human rights initially
appears to derive its attractiveness. Rawls' concept, however, does
retain the virtue of being, at least superficially, neutral as between
cultures: The specific social bases needed for self-respect could vary
among cultures; yet each could, in its own peculiar manner, satisfy
this need. The human needs approach thus appears to promise some
conception of universality that does not contravene the descriptive
fact of cultural pluralism.
Yet a needs-based approach suffers from several, probably fatal,
flaws. First, the range of scientifically verifiable human needs
remains quite narrow: "If we turn to science, we find an
extraordinarily limited set of needs. Even Christian Bay, probably
the best-known advocate of a needs theory of human rights, admits
that 'it is premature to speak of any empirically established needs
beyond sustenance and safety."' 1 1 If we introduce needs beyond the
physiological, we beg the question of universality, for cultures
construct these social needs. While they perhaps remain matters of
necessity given the specific mores of a cultural community, these
needs also, by definition, emerge as culturally contingent. The "social
bases of self-respect," then, proves far too malleable a concept, under
which, for instance, maltreatment of dalits (untouchables) in the
Hindu caste system might well appear justifiable. 0 2 Even more
fundamentally, however, the needs-based approach to universal
human rights suffers from the Humean naturalistic fallacy. It infers
certain moral "oughts" from empirical facts that, in themselves, can
create no obligations, still less "rights." Finally, while the specific list
of human rights that warrant universal status constitutes a distinct
inquiry, if we understand the UDHR's language to suggest at least
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the general contours of these rights, then many prominent human
rights remain unaccounted for by a needs-based approach. One
might attempt to circumvent this difficulty by expanding the idea of
"need" to entail social necessities. But as noted, this simply begs the
question, because by definition, it reintroduces cultural relativity-in
the form of socially-constructed needs-into human rights.
2. The Moral Naturalistic Approach
The failure of needs-based approaches to confer universality
upon human rights does not, however, exhaust the potential for
locating universality in that which is "fundamentally human" about
our species. Humans also seem to possess a capacity for moral
judgment that distinguishes us from animals. Whether or not we in
fact are autonomous agents, to which nebulous concepts like free
will-and its corollaries, agency, guilt, responsibility-may properly
be attributed, we behave in ways that implicitly assume the validity
of these concepts. It therefore may be a conditio sine qua non of
human civilization that we hold and entertain moral concepts and
10 3
evaluate each other in terms of these concepts.
Perhaps, then, one can locate the source of universal human
rights in man's peculiar capacity for moral judgment and behavior.
In part, this is Jack Donnelly's position. "The source of human
rights," he writes, "is man's moral nature, which is only loosely linked
to the 'human nature' defined by scientifically ascertainable
needs ....

We have human rights not to the requisites for health but

to those things 'needed' for a life of dignity, for a life worthy of a
10 4
human being, a life that cannot be enjoyed without these rights."
Donnelly's conception, as he readily acknowledges, amounts to no
more than a moral posit.'0 5 Yet he believes that universality inheres
in man's moral nature, insofar as one accepts the idea that such
103.
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rights inform our understanding of what it means to lead a "truly
human" life.
Human rights enjoy universality on this account
because "[w]ithout the enjoyment of (the objects of) human rights, one
is almost certain to be alienated or estranged from one's moral nature
... [L]osing these rights is morally 'impossible': one cannot lose these
rights and live a life worthy of a human being."'10 6
Donnelly's account retains a greater plausibility than the crude
human-needs approach. To begin, it resonates with the language of
the UDHR and other human rights instruments, which often invoke,
at least rhetorically, the "inherent dignity" of the human person as
the basis of human rights. 10 7 Unlike the needs-based approach that
purports to ground human rights without reference to their social
context, Donnelly's moral-naturalistic approach concedes that human
rights reflect moral and social posits. The problem is with his
assertion that, absent these posits, we could not lead "truly human"
lives. What could "truly human" mean in this context? Throughout
most of mankind's history, the very concept of human rights 10 8 was
unknown-a fact that Donnelly consistently emphasizes, and yet it
would strain credulity to insist that peoples of the vast majority of
civilizations that have existed to date have not lived "truly human"
lives.
In fairness, it bears emphasis that Donnelly intends his
statement about the conditions under which one may lead a "truly
human" life to be understood in context-as applicable to the modern
social and historical epoch in which the nation-state arguably
constitutes the principal threat to human dignity. He concedes,
consequently, that "where there is a thriving indigenous cultural
tradition and community, arguments of cultural relativism offer a
strong defense against outside interference-including disruptions
that might be caused by introducing 'universal' human rights. Such
communities, however, are increasingly the exception rather than the
rule,"'1 9 and Donnelly's argument for the conceptual appropriateness
of human rights to modern international law remains compelling. 110
The problem is that, by itself, this strategic move proves
underinclusive. The Taliban, for instance, might aptly be described
as a "thriving cultural tradition." But far from providing a "strong
defense against outside interference," the Taliban, at least facially,
appears to exemplify precisely the kind of situation in the modern
world--one in which egregious violations are being perpetrated in the
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109.
Id. at 118-19.
110.
See infra text accompanying note 242.

20011

UNIVERSALITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

557

service of an extremist ideology-in which interference under the
banner of universal human rights would appear justifiable. One
might finesse these circumstances by pointing out that individuals
harmed by the Taliban do not consent to this "thriving cultural
tradition,""' thus justifying humanitarian intervention to vindicate
their human rights. Indeed, as argued below, this would be an
appropriate suggestion. But this step involves a tacit regression to
the modern notion that individuals, not cultural groups, are the basic
bearers of rights, as well as the fundamental unit of concern and
value--or, put differently, it takes for granted one of the liberal
presumptions that cultural relativists challenge in the first place.
An additional, though related, difficulty with Donnelly's account
of the source of human rights resides in his distinction between
something's "being right," which implies a preordained value
hierarchy and therefore, cultural relativity, and someone's "having a
right."112 The latter, it seems, involves a social state of affairs that
obtains "universality" when within different cultural frameworks,
each of which internally ranks values in divergent ways, individuals
retain the right to choose among different values. Here again,
however, this seems to amount, at bottom, to a restatement of the
very liberal ideals that cultural relativism calls into question; for this
distinction resurrects the classical libertarian claim that individuals
must be permitted broad liberty to choose among competing
conceptions of the good. A characteristic formulation in Donnelly's
exposition clarifies this problem. Distinguishing something's "being
right" from someone's "having a right," he writes,
Simply because x is right it does not necessarily follow that anyone has
a right to x. For example, even if it is right to perform acts of
benevolence, such as assisting the needy and hungry, a hungry person
does not, ipso facto, have a right to receive food from me, or from
anyone else. He is not thereby entitled to my food or my money to buy
l
food: it is my food and my money; Ihave a right to it.13

Donnelly concedes that, under certain extenuating circumstanceswhere the scarcity of food is connected in certain ways to state
114
abuse-an individual might "have a right" to another person's food.

111.
We might also finesse this scenario by suggesting that, while the Taliban is
a "thriving cultural tradition," it is not one with an alternative conception of human

dignity. But this would be false. A member of the Taliban would likely assert that
human dignity is precisely what their movement attempts to establish in a civilization
corrupted by foreign and immoral influences. Destroying stocks of alcoholic beverages,
restricting the rights of women, imposing severe punishments for violations of Islamic
law, and so forth might all be redescribed as measures to instantiate an (albeit
questionable) conception of human dignity that this "thriving cultural tradition"

values. See infra text accompanying notes 171-75.
112.
See DONNELLY, supra note 5, at 9.
113.
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114.
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Yet the problem here runs deeper: the exposition of what it means to
"have a right" already presupposes a highly distinct set of cultural
values. Why, indeed, is it Donnelly, in the proffered example, and not
the hungry person, who "has a right" to his food or to his money?
Without recourse to, for instance, the Lockean notion that
"[w]hatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property," 5 it
remains difficult to provide a satisfactory categorical answer. Only
our culturally specific intellectual heritage-the values and modes of
thought it induces-causes this example to seem so intuitively
plausible. Donnelly's philosophical reliance upon a strict distinction
between some idea "being right" and someone "having a right" thus
remains susceptible to cultural relativist critiques.
It proves
impossible to say why someone "has a right" without articulating
some culturally specific sense of what "is right." Even in a non-legal
sense,1 1 6 then, "having a right" and "being right" turn out not, as
Donnelly argues, to be conceptually separable-in practice, this
distinction collapses.
3. The Transcendentalist Approach
A final possibility would locate the normative universality of
human rights in essential or transcendental conceptions of a natural
law that operate independently of human society; a view, as noted
earlier," 7 that finds classical expression in Aristotle and later in
Aquinas' distinction between positive-man-made-and divine or
natural law. Yet it bears emphasis that this manner of thought is not
unique to Western traditions.
All major religious traditionsChristianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, and Buddhism-manifest
concepts analogous to Aquinas' conception of divine law. They all,
that is, assert certain moral precepts as a universal code written into
the "true" nature of reality. From the perspective of their proponents,
these beliefs, as Diana Eck emphasizes, do not apply merely to a
single culture; they lay claim to universal acknowledgment:
When Jewish thinkers speak of the covenant with Noah and the
Noachide laws....

they are not making a claim that is true only if you

are Jewish, but a universal claim about the nature of human
responsibility. When Christians speak of human nature as having been
dignified by the human incarnation of God in Christ ....

they are not

115.
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116.
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making a tribal claim that is true only for those who happen to be
Christians.... This is also true of Islam in which Muslims speak of
submitting to God, or aligning one's life with the godward human
nature with which we are born. It is true for Buddhists when they
speak of human life as characterized by suffering.., a noble truth that
118
they claim for all, not just Buddhists.

Transcendentalist approaches render claims of universal human
rights coherent because they make strong claims about the ultimate
ontological status of the world and its inhabitants. But absent
genuine consensus on these issues-needless to say, this is lackingthe fact of cultural pluralism compels the conclusion that these
schemes will necessarily conflict. Empirical evidence establishing the
descriptive truth of cultural pluralism remains too strong to validate
scientifically any one of these esoteric metaphysical claims, and
"[t]the dangers of the moral imperialism implied by radical
universalism hardly need be emphasized."' 1 9 Western colonial
imperialism, for example, while undoubtedly motivated more by
economic than genuine ideological considerations, was in part
justified in terms of bringing spiritual salvation-via "universal"
Christian law-to the unenlightened peoples of other civilizations. 120
By asserting a transcendental universality for human rights, then,
natural law and other ontologically-based theories undermine a
central value of human rights itself-the tolerance of reasonable
pluralism.
In sum, efforts to locate an actual empirical consensus
concerning values "implicit in man's nature as an individual and as a
member of society"'12 1 fail to produce-both substantively and as a
matter of hermeneutics-agreement on human rights sufficient to be
termed "universal."
Furthermore, alternative philosophical
approaches that might vindicate the normative universality of human
rights, notwithstanding the empirical fact of cultural pluralism, prove
philosophically unsatisfactory, potentially dangerous, or both.

III. CULTURAL PLURALISM RECONSIDERED: CULTURAL
RELATIVISM IN A RELATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The foregoing discussion betrays a troubling silence in the
international human rights movement.
Talk of universalism
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pervades human rights discourse.
But it finds little supportempirical, historical, philosophical, or otherwise-in the diverse
"human rights" practices that characterize the contemporary global
community. Recognition of this descriptive fact invites the following
question: When human rights lawyers, philosophers, foreign
diplomats, advocates, and others speak of human rights as
"universal," are they doing anything more than asserting, for a fiftyyear old international political movement, the same dubious
transcendentalism that led us to reject religious absolutism? Does
the religious extremist's ideological universalism differ meaningfully
from that of the human rights activist?
Both advance strong
normative claims. Both assert these norms universally; they apply to
all human beings, not just to one culture. Not least, both believe,
albeit to varying degrees, that, at times, violence should be used to
deter, terminate, or punish violations of these norms. Holy wars and
'humanitarian intervention" rest on common ground in their
justification of the use of violence to vindicate norms of human
behavior. Can they be meaningfully distinguished?
Conceding the descriptive fact of cultural pluralism permits us to
examine more closely what normative implications it indeed supports,
and, perhaps as critically, those it does not. To assess the arguments
of cultural relativism, then, demands analysis of the normative
assertions advanced on behalf of the descriptive fact of cultural
pluralism, hereafter presumed unassailable on empirical grounds.
The first form of cultural relativism-narrative relativism,-asserts
that because every culture has its own distinctive topos, 12 2 or cultural
vocabulary, human rights may be an inappropriate or myopic
functional concept to promote human dignity in certain cultural
communities.
According to narrative relativism, alternative
conceptions of and mechanisms for promoting human dignity-those
rooted in the endogenous features of their cultural group-provide a
more legitimate measure for evaluating the propriety of their societal
practices. The second form of cultural relativism-crude relativisminsists that because conceptions of ultimate value vary from culture
to culture, imposing alleged universal norms of behavior on a group
that purports to reject them amounts to illegitimate cultural
imperialism.
Analysis of these broad normative challenges proves difficult in
the abstract. This Part, consequently, uses concrete examples as a
vehicle for examining the respective assertions of each. The first
section focuses on one aspect of the "Asian values" debate in an effort
to expound narrative relativism. In particular, it briefly assesses the

122.
See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a Multicultural Conception of
Human Rights, 18 ZEITSCRHRIFT FOR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 1 (1997).
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claim that certain cultural features alleged to characterize Asian
societies render Western conceptions of human rights incompatible
with their endogenous cultural values. The second section focuses on
crude cultural relativism through analysis of human rights violations
perpetrated by the Taliban's regime, which achieved effective control
of over two-thirds of Afghanistan's territory in 1996.
A. NarrativeRelativism
Imagine two men holding a captured puma on a rope. If they want to
approach each other, the puma will attack, because the rope vill
slacken; only if they both pull simultaneously on the rope is the puma
equidistant from the two of them. That is why it is so hard for him who
reads and him who writes to reach each other: between them lies a
mutual thought captured on ropes that they pull in opposite directions.
If we were now to ask that puma-in other words, that thought-how it
perceived these two men, it might answer that at the ends of the rope
those to be eaten are holding someone they cannot eat ....
-Milorad Pavid

123

Narrative relativism poses a number of conceptually distinct
challenges to universal human rights. In the present context, two of
these demand appraisal. First, does profound cultural pluralism and
diversity preclude the possibility of cognitive consensus on what
human rights mean? This Article endorses Donnelly's view that, even
if, as appears to be the case, most cultures lack an indigenous
conception of "rights," the internationalization of the Western nationstate model has made rights pertinent to nearly all contemporary
societies, and cross-cultural cognitive understandings and
appreciation of the value of these rights will continue to develop.
This is because human rights involve, at bottom, relations between
the individual and the nation-state--or other quasi-state authorities.
Second, assuming that certain cultures, though amenable to the idea
of human rights, wish to retain their endogenous conceptions of and
institutions for promoting human dignity-can the macrolegal
framework imposed by international human rights law accommodate
these alternative values and practices? This question, the Author
suggests, admits of no simple answer. Some cultural practices and
values are fully consistent with international human rights law; the
two normative frameworks can subsist-indeed, perhaps even
complement one another. But others undoubtedly violate universal
human rights. This invites the foundational inquiry, to which Part

123.
MILORAD PAVIC, DICTIONARY OF THE KHAZARS 14 (Christina Pribicevic-Zoric
trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1989) (1691).
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IV turns, into why, in instances of conflict, international human
rights merit precedence.
1. Cognitive Dissonance
To return to the first inquiry, suppose that two people, though
members of cultures wholly foreign to one another, agree that Article
3 of the UDHR articulates a genuinely universal human right:
124
"Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person."'
This nominal agreement may nonetheless veil deep reciprocal
misunderstandings. For two individuals rooted in different cultural
vocabularies, the right to "life, liberty and security of person" could
well be, in the language of Milorad Pavi6, "a mutual thought captured
on ropes that they pull in opposite directions."'1 2 5 The world's major
cultural traditions manifest a superficial "overlapping consensus: ' 126
the human rights tradition-a legacy of Western liberal thought-can
1 27
to some extent be reconciled with its "homeomorphic equivalents"'
in other cultures. But this consensus must be articulated at an
extremely high level of abstraction-most cultural traditions share
some belief in human dignity and an aversion to needless suffering
and cruelty. How, if at all, does this help advance the universality of
128
It
human rights? Not, the Author would argue, very much.
decisively fails to justify the use of human rights as the appropriate
functional concept for promoting human dignity, as opposed to, for
instance, conceptions of social duty and obligation that arguably

124.
G.A. Res. 217A, supra note 14, art. 3.
125
PAVIC, supranote 123.
126.
See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITIcAL LIBERALISM (1993). Rawls has
suggested that his mature conception of principles of justice appropriate to a liberal
society might be extended to develop "principles and norms of international law and
practice," a project first discussed in his Oxford Amnesty Lecture of February 12, 1993,
entitled "The Law of Peoples," and, more recently, developed fully in written form. See
generally JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (2001).
127.
See Raimundo Panikkar, Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western
Concept?, 120 DIOGENES 75 (1982), reprinted in STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 6, at
202 (defining a "homeomorphic equivalent" as an alternative cultural concept that
"satisfies the equivalent need"). While human rights protect human dignity in the
West, some argue that human duties fulfill a comparable role in other societies. E.g.,
Melanne Andromecca Civic, A Comparative Analysis of International and Chinese
Human Rights Law-Universality Versus Cultural Relativism, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 285,
287 (1996) (arguing that human rights in the Chinese cultural context "refer[s] to the
intricate web of social and political duties of citizens owed to the community at large').
128.
Samuel Huntington, though overstating the rhetorical force of this critique,
aptly captures the superficiality of this cultural consensus: "Most peoples in most
societies have a similar 'moral sense,' a 'thin' minimal morality of basic concepts of
what is right and wrong. If this is what is meant by universal civilization, it is both
profound and profoundly important, but it is also neither new nor relevant."
HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 56.
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prevail in some non-Western traditions.1 29 It perhaps draws within
the domain of universality some of the most uncontroversial human
rights, certain jus cogens norms of modern international law-the
prohibitions against genocide, torture, slavery and arguably a few
others. 130 Beyond these "easy cases," the interpretive challenge posed
by narrative relativism stands.
Recall, for instance, the subtextual disagreement about liberty
that occupied the drafters of the UDHR: Does genuine liberty only
obtain when individuals enjoy full control over their economic and
social circumstances? Or does it denote, as Western liberals would
emphasize, limits on the domain of legitimate state action? Clearly,
different answers to these questions will yield radically different, and
probably conflicting, understandings of what the "right to liberty" in
fact guarantees.
Thus, while crude cultural relativism invokes
ethical relativism to challenge universality, narrative relativism
makes an argument that, albeit replete with ethical implications,
finds its logical foundation in a form of cognitive relativism. Any
appraisal of narrative relativist claims will therefore pose acute
methodological difficulties. Evaluation demands disengagement from
deeply rooted cognitive and linguistic13 1 principles that circumscribe
our ability to appraise phenomena in the first place.' 3 2 "Observation
of others is so difficult," Michael Reisman notes, "not because other
groups . . . are more complex than ours, but because our own so
profoundly shape us, at levels of consciousness so deep that we are
often unaware of it."1 3 3 Where the cognitive processes of different
cultures do not converge at all, one's evaluation of the other remains,

129.
In certain Native American cultures, for example, human dignity inheres in
the critical importance placed on the reciprocal relations between individuals and their
network of familial or tribal relations. "Humanity" describes an all.inclusive concept
that extends beyond the human species to embrace animals and, at times, inanimate
objects. See James IV. Zion, North American Indian Perspectives on Human Rights. in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE:

A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS, supra

note 105, at 198, 198-207.
130.
Even among these-arguably, jus cogens-human rights norms, some
individuals will continue to claim that their cultural traditions permit the proscribed
practices under certain circumstances. The mere existence of an exception does not

refute the rule. That certain individuals, political groups, or cultural traditions justify
torture or genocide in the service of interests or ideologies does not remove these
practices from the corpus of universal human rights violations. Universal, in this
context, does not-and need not, according to any standard that is not wholly
descriptive-mean "we all agree." On the other hand, normative universality based
upon a factual state of affairs demands an extraordinarily high level of consensus.
Otherwise, such claims would reduce to irresolvable-and, in practice, futile-debates
about the required degree of cross-cultural consensus.
131.

Pertinent, in this regard, is Wittgenstein's maxim that "[the limits of my

language are the limits of my world." LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTAus LoGicoPHILOSOPHICUS § 5.6 (1961).
132.
See REISMAN, supra note 19, at 153-56.

133.

Id. at 153.
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by definition, impossible; no common reference provides the
"Archimedes point" from which to derive criterion for evaluating
cultural practices and values.
At the same time, it would be foolish to abandon the project of
cross-cultural evaluation merely because we lack a perfect set of
shared evaluative criteria. First of all, the appraisal of phenomena in
the absence of objective criteria is hardly unique to the social
sciences; even physics, the quintessential natural science, emphasizes
the critical and, at times, determinative impact that the evaluator's
perspective exerts upon the object of evaluation. Second, biological
similarity means that humans from different cultures will still share
at least some rudimentary cognitive processes.
Whatever their
culture, different individuals share, for example, similar modes of
processing information, capacities for pain and pleasure, and an
134
ability to differentiate rational from irrational chains of thought.
Finally, as Bernard Williams emphasizes, core cultural values cannot
"merely evaporate because one is confronted with human beings in
another society."' 13 5 Cross-cultural human interaction would be
impossible if people refrained wholly from appraising foreign cultural
practices and values, and from modifying our behavior toward them
accordingly. Particularly in an interdependent "globalized" world,
international law must strive to develop principles to mediate among
the diverse cognitive frameworks that different actors bring to crosscultural exchanges.
Cross-cultural cognitive relativism, like cultural pluralism, is an
empirical fact. This, by itself, is nothing new. Within societies, too,
"[pjerception of the same phenomena may vary depending on the
13
culture, class, gender, age, or crisis-experience of the observer."'
We do not, however, resign ourselves to the nihilistic view that
shared perceptions of legal and social norms are impossible. Nor do
we abandon attempts at mutual understanding as futile.
We
acknowledge the difficulties that cognitive disparity generates but
strive to ameliorate these problems through the definitional human
capacity for communication. Of course, in circumstances of conflict,
one or another alternative perception of norms necessarily prevails.
We must, consequently, maintain social and legal mechanisms for
deciding which perception, in a given instance, should win out. But
this is simply to restate a classic question of political theory: How is

134.
This is not to suggest that what is deemed "rational" will be uniform among
diverse cultures, to the contrary, but, at least according to many theorists, our capacity
for complex rational thought differentiates man from the remainder of the animal
world.
135.
Williams, supra note 10, at 173.
136.
REISMAN, supra note 19, at 154.

20011

UNIVERSALITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

5&5

a society of diverse individuals possible? 137 To challenge the
universality of human rights on these grounds is to transpose a
timeless political inquiry to the international plane, and it is not clear
what, exactly, this is intended to prove, save for the relatively
uncontroversial proposition that no strong cross-cultural consensus
about human rights presently exists.
Cognitive relativism may indeed mean that citizens of states
with disparate cultural traditions will at times interpret identical
provisions of human rights treaties in incompatible ways-pulling a
mutual thought captured on ropes in opposite directions. Perhaps an
individual whose values have been shaped by Confucian traditions
will be more likely to understand the ICCPR's guarantee of "liberty
and security of person" to refer to the state's duty to preserve law and
order, while a Western liberal will presumably understand this
provision to refer principally to her right to protection from arbitrary
state interference. This, however, simply begs the question of which
conception, in circumstances of international conflict, should prevail,
Cross-cultural
and this question is normative, not descriptive.
repudiates
the universal
no
more
cognitive-narrative--relativism
applicability of human rights than intra-societal cognitive relativism
repudiates the uniform application of domestic law to a state's diverse
citizenry.
2. The 'Tyranny" of Human Rights
With this background in mind, this section considers briefly one
aspect of the so-called "Asian values" debate. This blanket label
embraces a number of diverse claims, including: (1) that there is
claims including: distinct "Asian" approach to human rights;138 (2)
that this approach, rooted in Confucianism, focuses first and foremost
on communal welfare rather than individual rights; 139 (3) that Asians

137.
E.g., RAWLS, supra note 126, at xviii (arguing that the fundamental
"problem of political liberalism is: How is it possible that there may exist over time a
stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable...
religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?").
138.
E.g., Robert Weatherley, Introduction to THE DISCOURSE OF HUA RIGHTS
IN CHINA:

HISTORICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1-2 (Robert Weatherley ed.,

1999) (noting that Beijing challenges "the concept [of human rights] itself' as an
inappropriate "model' or 'criterion"' to apply to China in view of its distinctive
historical and national background); see also Amartya Sen, Human Rights and
Economic Achievements, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 88, 89-90
(Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999) ("The focus on discipline as opposed to
rights has received support not merely from the supposed effectiveness of that priority,
but also from the importance of being true to Asia's 'own traditions.-).
139.
E.g., Bilahari Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, 92 FOREIGN POLICY 26
(1993), reprinted in STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 6, at 226, 230 (distinguishing the
"individualist ethos of the West" from the "communitarian traditions of Asia"); Triggs.
supranote 29, at 669-70 ("[T]he Western emphasis on the individual appears to conflict
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prioritize law, social order, and security above individual civil and
political rights; 140 and finally (4) that this heavy-handed focus on
social order at the expense of civil and political liberties not only
resonates with Asian values, but is necessary and appropriate to the
141
process of economic development and modernization.
These claims are in large part empirical, and the debate over
their validity forms a subject of continuing academic inquiry and

with Eastern cultures where individual rights may give way to community
interests ....
There is a fear that international human rights standards are
overzealous of the rights of the individual, placing the community itself in jeopardy.');
see also HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 71-72 (citing surveys and empirical data
suggesting the prevalence of individualism in the Western world, by contrast to the
alleged "collectivism" that prevails in non-Western cultures). For a cogent critique of
these claims, see, for example, Inoue Tatsuo, Liberal Democracy and Asian
Orientalism, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 138, at
27, 54 (observing that "individualist-communitarian tensions run not between the West
and Asia but within each of them'). China scholar Win. Theodore de Bary likewise
observes that "[s]pokesmen for what is called an 'Asian' communitarian position are
not wrong in supposing that the concept of a radically free-standing, autonomous
individual is foreign to Confucianism, but the contrast is more with the modern age
than it is with some earlier Western traditions, themselves more communitarian .... "
WM. THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
A CONFUCIAN
COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE 22 (1998). Finally, even assuming the validity of an
"individualist-communitarian" dichotomy, it requires an additional, and by no means
clearly justified, leap in logic to assert that "communitarian Asians," whatever that
means, therefore desire authoritarian governance that devalues individual liberties.
Indeed, as de Bary emphasizes, Confucian concepts of civility, duty, and social
obligation were "achieved by voluntary rites, locally observed, rather than by an
overarching (and often over-reaching) state"; hence the irony implicit in Asian values
rhetoric to the effect that communitarianism is "readily and directly translatable into a
law-and-order society dominated by an authoritarian central government." Id. at 13.
140.
E.g., Kausikan, supra note 139, at 230 ("Good government may well
require, among other things, detention without trial to deal with military rebels or
religious and other extremists; curbs on press freedoms to avoid fanning racial tensions
or exacerbating social divisions; and draconian laws to break the power of entrenched
interests in order to, for instance, establish land reforms.').
141.
This claim, as Donnelly has noted, is in fact twofold: At times, Asian values
proponents preach a "liberty trade-off," which "holds that civil and political rights
introduce so many inefficiencies in government that they must be systematically
infringed by a state seeking rapid economic development;" but elsewhere, in
statements seemingly at war with rhetoric suggesting that Asian countries prioritize
economic and social rights for their citizens, adherents of the "Lee thesis" suggest that
individual economic rights, too, must defer to the paramount objective of state
economic development, a claim that Donnelly denotes the "equity trade-off." Jack
Donnelly, Human Rights and Asian Values: A Defense of "Western" Universalism, in
THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 138, at 60, 72-76. Both of
these claims suffer from a dubious empirical basis. See id at 73; see also Sen, supra
note 138, at 91. Indeed, as Sen famously argues, "one of the remarkable facts in the
terrible history of famines in the world is that no substantial famine has ever occurred
in any country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press." Son,
supra note 138, at 92.
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critique. 142 But whatever our view of "Asian values," one premise of
these theories is indisputable-the descriptive fact of cultural
pluralism. Cultural mores, social rules, and legal institutions vary
widely, and homogenization of these norms is not likely to obtain in
the near future. Nor, most commentators would agree, would this be
desirable. While modern rhetoric at times seems excessive in its
praise of diversity "for its own sake," legitimate instrumental,
aesthetic, and ethical rationales favor cultural, like individual,
diversity. The paradox, however, resides in the fact that a significant
subset of these diverse cultural traditions do not themselves value or
tolerate diversity.
Human rights do not mandate a monolithic set of values. Nor do
they ordain a singular "conception of the good." The protections that
universal human rights extend to all human beings permit
individuals of widely disparate religious, political, and moral beliefs
to coexist within a common international order. At the same time,
however, universal human rights, ex hypothesi, apply with equal force
and authority to all human beings. Consequently, cultural practices
and values that conflict irreconcilably with international human
rights law must yield. In this regard human rights indeed represent
a kind of moral and legal "tyranny"-where endogenous cultural
practices and international human rights conflict, the former must
defer to the latter.
Too often, however, this conflict is portrayed in misleading
terms, as a "clash" between diametrically opposed sets of cultural
values. 143

Bilahari Kausikan, for example, presents the debate as

one between "[tjhe individualistic ethos of the West or the
communitarian traditions of Asia? The consensus-seeking approach of
East and Southeast Asia or the adversarial institutions of the
West?"144 This misconstrues the problem that "universal" human
rights poses-to what extent all the world's disparate systems of
cultural values and practices can be reconciled with the overarching
framework of law established by international human rights.
Donnelly thus notes correctly, in the context of the "Asian values"
debate, that "where traditional practices conflict irreconcilably ith
internationally recognized human rights, traditional practices usually
must give way-just as traditional Western practices such as racial

142.

See generally THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note

143.

E.g., HUNTINGTON, supranote 11.

144.

Kausikan, supranote 139, reprinted in STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 6, at

138.
230. But see Amartya Sen, Thinking About Human Rights and Asian Values, 4 HUMAN
RIGHTS DIALOGUE, 2, 2-3 (1996) (arguing that this dichotomy exaggerates and
overstates the real differences between Western and Eastern traditions, both of which
manifest strands of individualism and communitarianism).
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and gender discrimination and the persecution of religious deviants
have been required to give way."
At the same time, he observes that "internationally recognized
human rights leave considerable space for distinctively Asian
implementations of these rights.' 145 The crucial point here is that

within each state, and within each of its constituent cultural groups
and peoples, multiple systems of value subsist. To set up a simple
dichotomy between "universal human rights," on the one hand, and
"endogenous cultural values," on the other, misconstrues the real
problem-to determine, in each case, what degree of cultural or

domestic variation remains consistent with international human
rights norms. This notion finds expression in the European human
rights system's doctrine of a "margin of appreciation." In the
Handyside Case,146 the European Court of Human Rights observed
that:
[ilt is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting
States a uniform European conception of morals .... By reason of their
direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries,
State authorities are in principle in a better position than the
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these
requirements ... [and] to make the initial assessment of the reality of
the pressing social need implied by the notion of 'necessity' in this
147
context [of Article 10 § 2 of the European Convention.]

The implementation of human rights need not, that is, be wholly

indifferent to salient differences in the prevailing moral and social
norms within a state.
Some variation is permissible-indeed,
perhaps even desirable, because the efficacy of international human

rights law ultimately depends on a "process of interaction,
'148
interpretation, and internalization of international norms.
Progression towards cognitive consensus on the meaning of different
human rights may benefit from the flexibility enabled by a "domestic
margin of appreciation." It is clear, for example, that "due process"
under international human rights law does not demand the Anglo-

Saxon "adversarial" as opposed to the Continental "inquisitorial"
model, or vice versa. Functionally equivalent safeguards in each
system can independently satisfy its requirements.

145.
Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Asian Values: A Defense of "Western"
Universalism, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 138, at
83.
146.
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976), available at
http://echr.coe.intleng.
147.
Id. at para. 48.
148.
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE
L.J. 2599, 2603 (1997) (reviewing ABRAHAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES,
THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS (1995) and THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1995)).
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But it is equally clear that a politically-controlled judiciary-

under either model, and whether 'Vestern" or "Asian"-would not
conform to international human rights law. To return to the "Asian

values" debate, it is clear that nothing about, say, Confucian values of
familial obligation, social duty, virtue, and so forth, necessarily
conflicts with human rights law.
Like all moral systems,
Confucianism can promote human dignity and social stability. Yet,
again like all moral systems, its norms can suffer manipulation and
political abuse, particularly as the cultural context in which
Confucianism developed and thrived deteriorates. De Bary notes
that:
[t]he very real social problems attributed to the -individualistic West"violence, crime, drug and sex abuse, and breakdown of family life, to
name only the most obvious-attend the modernization process
wherever it goes on, in East or West. Thus it is less a question of Asian
versus Western values than a problem of how the forces of a runaway
economic and technological modernization are eroding traditional
149
values in both Asia and the West.

Perhaps most critically, then, we should appreciate that that there is
nothing uniquely "Asian" about the underlying substantive inquiry
that the "Asian values" debate presents-to what extent subordinate
systems of morality and social values can subsist within an
overarching legal framework structured by international human
rights. Contemporary societies throughout the globe must confront
this question, and scholars rightly devote attention to articulating
principled solutions to the diverse problems it generates.1 50
The question, then, that "Asian values" like "Christian values" or
any other broadly defined categorization of a group moral code
presents is not monolithic. Depending on how we delimit their scope,
some Asian values will prove consonant with human rights law, while
others will violate or at least be in tension with it. Similarly, were we
to denominate a broad class of microlegal norms '"estern values," we
would likewise discover that some norms embraced by this crude
label conform to human rights standards, while others do not. But
note that these case-by-case inquiries presume that the foundational
question-which international code provides the appropriate criteria

149.
150.

DE BARY, supranote 139, at 8.
E.g., REISMAN, supra note 19, at 149-53. Reisman argues that the:

right of group formation and, within the group, the tolerated authority of the
group elite over other members, are extended insofar as they are indispensable
for the achievement of individual rights ....[and) the discovery of deviations
will lead to the insistence that practices inconsistent with the international
standard be adjusted to come within broad margins of conformity to those
standards.
Id. at 158; see also KYMLICKA, supra note 4, at 152-72.
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against which to appraise disparate cultural values and practiceshas been answered. Once we agree that international human rights
law in fact provides the right common standard, we can appraise
value systems in terms of their relative conformity to it. Thus,
cultural relativists, including "Asian values" proponents, must deny
the former premise-that international human rights law provides
the right criteria.
Narrative relativism admittedly presents difficulties for
implementing human rights, but, as indicated above, these are
neither new nor insurmountable. The crux of any critique based on
cultural relativism must therefore reside at a more foundational
level. It must challenge the notion that the criteria identified by
international human rights should not, normatively, be applicable to
all the diverse subordinate value systems that subsist throughout the
globe-as much within "Western" as within "Asian" states. To defend
the normative universality of human rights, consequently, requires
us to articulate why, in circumstances where microlegal values and
practices conflict with international human rights, the latter merit
our respect as paramount standards.
B. Crude Cultural Relativism
['Clulture' is never an essentialist and homogenous body of traditions
and customs, but a rich resource, usually full of internal contradictions,
and a resource which is always used selectively in various ethnic,
cultural and religious projects within specific power relations and
political discourse.
-Nira Yuval-Davis

1 51

On September 27, 1996, Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, fell to
a militant Muslim group known as the Taliban, a name derived from
"the Persianized plural form of the Arabic word 'Talib,' which means
religious student."'152 The Taliban initially comprised a "small
spontaneous group" of religious students who "felt outrage at the
behavior of the Mujahidin leaders fighting for power in the city
and... decided to take action to end what they saw as corrupt
practices, drawing on Islam as a justification for their
intervention. '153 For reasons that remain somewhat nebulous, the

151.
NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS, GENDER & NATION 38 (1997), quoted in PETER
MARSDEN, THE TALIBAN: WAR, RELIGION & THE NEW ORDER IN AFGHANISTAN 114
(1998).
152.
William Maley, Introduction to FUNDAMENTALISM REBORN?: AFGHANISTAN

AND THE TALIBAN 1 (William Maley ed., 1998).
153.
MARSDEN, supra note 151, at 43. According to a background paper
prepared by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the group initially consisted
principally of ethnic Pashtuns from the city of Kandahar in Southern Afghanistan,
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Taliban quickly grew into a formidable armed force, receiving
military training, ammunition, and weaponry from a number of
sources. 154 In October 1994, the Taliban launched a campaign to
overthrow the ruling Mujahidin government.15 5 Within two years,
the group controlled two-thirds of Afghan territory. 15 6
The astonishing speed and success of the Taliban's military
campaign reflected in part the weakness of the "so-called Mujahidin
Government," which amounted to a mere "coalition government made
up of an amalgam of the seven political parties that had previously
formed the Afghan Interim Government. 157 Yet the Taliban's
success also was attributable to its reputation for religious purity and
good behavior. By contrast to the diverse governmental forces,
paramilitary groups, bandits, and others that had abused sectors of
the population following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the Taliban
quickly formed a reputation, which preceded their incremental
military advances, "for behaving relatively well when taking new
areas-they did not engage in looting, rape or mindless
destruction ....

15

Yet as they consolidated control over each region, the Taliban
imposed rigid behavioral strictures on the population-rules derived
from their own stringent interpretation of Shari'a, or Islamic law. 159
It was for the imposition of these rules that the Taliban drew
condemnation from the human rights community. Decrees required
men to "wear turbans, beards, short hair and shalwar kameez and
women to wear the burqa, a garment the covers the entire body,
including the face."'160 The Taliban prohibited women from working
and barred them from education-at least until an "appropriate"
Islamic curriculum could be drawn up by religious scholars. This

many of whom had graduated from Pakistani Islamic colleges (madrassas) that border

Afghanistan.

See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Centre for

Documentation and Research, Update to the Background Paper on Refugees and
Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan, para. 3 (Jan. 1999), at http://-ww.unhcr.cht
refvorldlcountry/cdr/cdrafg.02.html [hereinafter UNHCR].
154.
MARSDEN, supra note 151, at 43. The Taliban received support from.
among others, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and they "were also able to draw on a
significant quantity of weaponry, either abandoned by retreating forces or found in the
process of disarming the population." Id. For a detailed analysis of the military
ascendancy of the Taliban, see Anthony Davis, How the Taliban Became a Military
Force, in FUNDAMENTALISM REBORN?: AFGHANISTAN AND THE TAUBA., supra note
152, at 43-71.
155
MAR5DEN, supra note 151, at 43-48.

156

See id.

157.
Id. at 42. The Mujahidin suffered from internal power struggles, lack of
popular confidence in their Islamic credentials, and, perhaps most critically, the
absence of grass-roots support among the rural population. See id.

158.

Id. at 48.

159
160.

See id.
Id. at 46.
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project could not begin, according to Taliban leaders, until they had
consolidated control over all Afghan territory. 16 1 Additional decrees
proscribed music, games, and representations of the human or animal
162
form, such as televised images.
What horrified the international community, however, was not
so much the rules as it was the shocking punitive methods by which
they were enforced. Adulterers were stoned to death. 163 Women who
neglected to wear the burqa or who accidentally exposed their ankles
suffered whippings or public beatings. 164 Shari'a courts, reportedly
composed of judges "untrained in the law and bas[ing] their judgment
on a mixture of personal understandings of Islamic law and a tribal
code of honour prevalent in Pashtun areas," issued sentences
condemning the convicted to public hangings, strangulation and
punitive amputations. 165 Arbitrary detention, mass executions,
indiscriminate killing of civilians-particularly during the battle of
Mazar-I-Sharif in which an estimated 2,000 to 5,000 persons were
killed-suppression of journalistic freedoms, and other abuses
continue to characterize the Taliban's regime. Many of these latter
violations reflect the ongoing civil war and the Taliban's somewhat
tenuous hold on sovereignty. The former, by contrast, reflect beliefs
and practices that, though fully in conformity with cultural norms
deemed legitimate-indeed, appropriate-by the Taliban's leaders,

161
See id.
162.
Id.
163.
UNHCR, supra note 153, para. 5.2.
164.
See Amnesty International, Women in Afghanistan: the Violations
Continue, Al Report ASA 11/05/97 (June 1997), at http://wwwamnesty.org/ailib/aipub/
1997/ASA/31100597.html. For a description of prevailing human rights conditions in
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, see generally Report on the Situation of Human Rights
in Afghanistan Submitted by Mr. Kamal Hossain, Special Rapporteur, in Accordance
with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1998/70, Commission on Human
Rights, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/40 (Mar. 24, 1999); Final
Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan Submitted by Mr. ChoongHyun Paik, Special Rapporteur, in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights
Resolution 1996/75, Commission on Human Rights, 53rd Sess., Agenda Item 10, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1997/59 (1997); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1999, at 161-64
(1998); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR,
AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1998 (March 1999)
[hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE].
165.
See UNHCR, supra note 153, para. 5.2. In 1998, according to the U.S. State
Department:
Taliban courts imposed their extreme interpretation of Islamic law and
punishments following swift summary trials. Murderers were subjected to
public executions, sometimes by throat slitting, a punishment that at times was
inflicted by the victims' families. Thieves were subjected to public amputations
of either one hand or one foot, or both ....
Adulterers were stoned to death or
publicly whipped with 100 lashes. Those found guilty of homosexual acts were
crushed by having walls toppled over them.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 164, § 1(c).
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strike foreign observers as perhaps the most egregious violations. To
what extent, if any, can criticism of these abuses be dismissed as the
imperialistic application of foreign norms to a culture that expressly
rejects them?
The Taliban provide a particularly poignant example of crude
cultural relativism.
By contrast to certain "Asian values"
proponents-who purport to accept international human rights,
rejecting only their '"estern" interpretation or imposition 6 6 -the
Tahban pull no punches; they repudiate international human rights
law lock, stock, and barrel. Prior to the Taliban's rise to power,
Afghanistan had ratified many of the seminal treaties constitutive of
the modern international human rights regime. 167 But the Taliban
have stated unequivocally that, should treaty obligations conflict with
their understanding of the Shari'a, they will be ignored:
During his visit to Kabul, the Special Rapporteur asked the AttorneyGeneral of the Taliban how they intended to deal with obligations
stemming from international human rights treaties. He indicated that
if a promise, convention, treaty or other instrument, even if it was in
the Charter of the United Nations, was contrary to Shariah. they would
not fulfill it or act on it. If the Charter were to proscribe executing a
murderer, which the Shariah allowed, "We accept Shariah, our God's
convention." The Attorney General added that, "If someone is drinking
in public, even if the Covenant or United Nations Charter says they
should not be punished, we will. The core of our action and our policy is
the law of God, as contained in the Koran. We do not follow
individuals, or people or other countries. We follow the law of God." 16 8

On November 10, 1995, UNICEF issued a communiqu6 stating that,
as a consequence of the Taliban's breach of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, to which Afghanistan is party, it would suspend
166. E.g., Kausikan, supra note 139; Statement by Ambassador Wu Jdanmin,
Head of the Chinese Observer Delegation, Subcommission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 6 (Aug. 8,1996)
("[T]he Chinese Government attaches equal importance to the protection of the civil
and political rights of the people .... In doing so. however, China proceeds from its

own national conditions instead of copying from others' models.").
167.
Afghanistan is party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; the Convention on the Political
Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; the International Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195;
the ICESCR, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; the ICCPR, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
171; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39146, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.,
Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A139151 (1985); and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44125, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. (No. 49), at 166,
U.N. Doc. A/RES144I49 (1990).
168.
Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan Submitted
by Mr. Choong-Hyun Paik, Special Rapporteur, in Accordance with Commission on
HumanRights Resolution 1996175, Commission on Human Rights. 53rd Sess., Agenda
Item 10, para. 31, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1997/59 (1997); see also UNHCR, supra note 153.
para. 5.
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169
aid to educational programs from which girls had been excluded.
Predictably, "[t]his argument made no impression, for the Taliban
recognise only the validity of Shar'ia; they do not feel bound by UN
human rights instruments, which they regard in good part as vehicles
of Western cultural imperialism.' 170 Sher Muhammad Stanakzai, the
Taliban's acting foreign minister, responded in kind to international
criticism of the Taliban's use of hudud, certain punishments
prescribed by Shari'a criminal law, including stoning adulterers and
amputating the limbs of thieves. "We have not introduced this law,"
Sher Stanakzai proclaimed on Voice of Shari'a Radio, "This is the law
that was revealed by God to Muhammad. Those who consider the
imposition of this law to be against human rights are insulting all
171
Muslims and their beliefs."
These statements, needless to say, constitute an unambiguous
repudiation of the alleged universality of human rights. The Taliban
do not purport to respect human rights in their own, culturally
contingent, sense, or to acknowledge rights but accord them a more
subordinate role in their overall hierarchy of cultural values. Nor do
they claim that human rights mean something different in Afghan
society. Quite the contrary, they view international human rights as
part and parcel of the corrupt influences and imperialistic Western
practices that they aim to eradicate. Thus, in response to a torrent of
international human rights-based criticism of their treatment of
women, 172 one Taliban official said the purpose of these laws is 'to
protect [our] sisters from corrupt people."" 73 On December 6, 1996,
the Department for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, a
Taliban agency established to implement the moral strictures of
Shari'a, stated that its policies ensure the "dignity and honour of a
Muslim woman .... -174 The paradox here bears emphasis: while
international human rights presumptively protect the "dignity and
worth of the human person,"' 75 it is precisely this dignity that the
Taliban invoke in defense of practices alleged to constitute human
rights violations. Imposing punitive measures on the drunkard, the

169.

Nancy

Hatch

FUNDAMENTALISM REBORN?

Dupree,

Afghan

Women

Under

the

Taliban,

in

AFGHANISTAN AND THE TALIBAN, supra note 152, at 145-

46.
170.
Id. at 147.
171.
MARSDEN, supra note 151, at 63 (quoting Sher Muhammad Stanakzai,
Voice of Sharia Radio, Nov. 20, 1996).
172.
See Dupree, supra note 169, at 148-49 (noting condemnation of the
Taliban's "medieval" treatment of women by: the Director-General of UNESCO, the
European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid, former Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright).
173.
Id. at 149 (quoting Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Taliban's Acting Minister of
Information and Culture).
174.
MARSDEN, supra note 151, at 63.
175.
G.A. Res. 217A, supra note 14, pmbl.
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adulterer, or the "indecently exposed" woman does not violate
dignity-far from it; such measures, in the Taliban's view, promote it.
As Jack Donnelly therefore rightly points out, "[a]lternative
conceptions of human dignity amount to challenges to the idea of
1 76
human rights."
How can advocates of universal human rights respond effectively
to the challenge presented by crude relativism? To begin, it will help
to restate this challenge in its most general form: because, as a
matter of social fact, cultures maintain divergent mores and
conceptualize human rights differently, or not at all, the coercive
imposition of international human rights norms on cultures that
claim to reject them amounts to unjustified cultural imperialism.
"Coercive imposition" is a tautology. But it bears the emphasis, for
what is ultimately at stake is the legitimacy of some form of
coercion. 177 In short, either (1) the descriptive fact of cultural
pluralism means the Taliban should be permitted to order Afghan
society in accordance with their culturally contingent-but no less
legitimate-interpretation of Shari'a, in which case we tolerate their
behavioral strictures and the coercive methods by which they are
enforced against members of their cultural community (stoning
adulterers to death, amputating the limbs of thieves); or (2) we deny
that cultural pluralism means that cultural groups enjoy absolute
latitude to structure their social, legal, and political order as they see
fit, in which case we also embrace the idea that international actors
can and should intervene-through violence at times-to coerce an
17
end to these practices. 8
We might, therefore, restate the challenge as follows: Does
cultural relativism render certain kinds of coercion under the banner
of "universal" human rights illegitimate? Before suggesting several
answers, this Section canvasses two plausible approaches that, while
not without a significant strategic role in the promotion and
enforcement of international human rights, do not ultimately
confront this challenge directly. The first shall be called "legal
positivist," after the influential and predominant jurisprudential

176.
DONNELLY, supra note 5, at 50.
177.
See David Maybury-Lewis, Anthropologists. Anthropology and the Relativist
Challenge, in Symposium, HUMAN RIGHTS AT HARVARD, Apr. 5, 1997 (1999), at 24, 29
(noting that "[als one runs through the various, contentious practices like sati [the

Hindu practice of widows throwing themselves on the funeral pyres of their husbands]
and female circumcision, the arguments eventually boil down to coercion").

178.

This latter statement, needless to say, is a theoretical proposition about

moral legitimacy. In practice, of course, we frequently remain incapable of acting

effectively to terminate ongoing human rights abuses, or the international community
lacks the political will to intervene even if it were feasible. China's brutal fift'-year
occupation of Tibet is a paradigmatic example of both of these phenomena. See
generally INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, TIBET- HuNMAN RIGHTS & THE RULE
OF LAW (1997).
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school. The legal positivist acknowledges the descriptive fact of
cultural pluralism but suggests that, from the standpoint of
international law, cultural relativism remains simply inapposite.
Nothing about this relative moral value claim, for the legal positivist,
affects the empirical status of the legal proposition that universal
human rights-as codified in international treaties to which states
remain party-retain binding force. The second approach, articulated
in the compelling work of Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, 179 may be
labeled the "cross-cultural consensus" approach.
This argument
seeks to invoke the cultural resources available in each culture to
forge a cross-cultural consensus that invests human rights with
universal legitimacy. This consensus-based on the interpretation,
reappropriation, and redeployment of alternative schemes of human
dignity found in cultures lacking an indigenous "rights" traditionallegedly bestows upon universal human rights a more genuine
legitimacy than external impositions of value.
1. The Legal Positivist Approach
The positivist confronts the descriptive fact of cultural pluralism
with a form of legal realism. He does not deny the validity of cultural
relativism.
Nor does he suggest that human rights inherently
possess a greater legitimacy than alternative conceptions of human
dignity. The positivist instead repudiates cultural relativism on the
basis of empirically verifiable legal facts. After the UDHR's adoption
in 1948 and the astonishingly rapid subscription of nations to the
treaties constitutive of the modern international human rights
regime, human rights obtained "universality" in virtue of their
codification as legal norms binding on nearly all states. Arguably,
even states that have not ratified these treaties are bound by human
rights law because these norms-or, at least, some widely subscribed
subset of them-have crystallized into customary international law.
Returning to the Taliban, the legal positivist might point out, as
numerous international actors did, 180 that Afghanistan is party to the
ICCPR, the Torture Convention, and the Convention on the Political

179.
E.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward a Cross-CulturalApproach to
Defining InternationalStandards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 105, at 19 [hereinafter An-Na'im, Toward a Cross-Cultural
Approach]; Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, The Contingent Universality of Human Rights:
The Case of Freedom of Expression in African and Islamic Contexts, 11 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 29 (1997).
180.
See Dupree, supra note 169, at 146-49. United Nations "special peace
mediator," Dr. Norbert Holl, for example, "warned that it was not up to the Taliban
leaders to rule on human rights, since 'Whoever is controlling Afghanistan is bound by
the Charter of the U.N."' Id. at 149 (citing Holl Asks Taliban to Ensure Human Rights,
THE NATION, Oct. 22, 1996).
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Rights of Women. All of these treaties arguably proscribe the dubious
judicial procedures and punishments instituted by the Taliban. 181
Additionally, international law does not excuse a state party of its
treaty obligations simply by virtue of a change in its domestic law or
182
a governmental transition.
Thus, for nations that acknowledge international law-or, at
least, have a stake in being perceived as a state that abides by its
international obligations-legal positivist universality can exert
significant pressures to comply with human rights standards. It
therefore serves a crucial value: when manipulated with diplomatic
and strategic acuity, it can effect positive changes in the human
rights practices of certain state actors. At the theoretical level,
however, as the example of the Taliban clarifies, legal positivism fails
Legal
to answer satisfactorily the crude relativist challenge.
positivism is compelling only to the extent that state actors accept
one of its axiomatic claims-that legal obligations can exist quite
independent of comprehensive moral, philosophical, or religious
doctrines. 183 But the Taliban, far from embracing this dichotomy,
expressly repudiates it. Marsden observes that the Taliban's creed
derives in part from that of the Muslim Brotherhood of the late1920s, which proclaimed that Islam is a "comprehensive self-evolving
system... applicable to all times and places."' 4 No distinction exists
between the secular public world and an alleged private sphere of
"comprehensive moral, philosophical or political doctrines."185 The
positivist argument that legal obligations-here, international

181. E.g., Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, arts. i-ii,
27 U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (enfranchisement of women and non-discrimination
in the political realm); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, art. 1, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, arts. 7 (prohibition
of torture), 14 (due process guarantees), 18 (freedom of thought, conscience and
religion), 26 (non-discrimination), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
182. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 690 (1969) C"A party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."); see
also Tinoco Case (Great Brit. v. Costa Rica), 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 369 (1923).
reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 147 (1924) (holding that a domestic transition in
government does not relieve a state party of international obligations assumed by
treaty under the prior regime).
183.
See generally RAWLS, supra note 126 (arguing that political liberalism
demands pubic justifications for principles of political justice that do not rely upon
individuals' idiosyncratic "comprehensive moral, philosophical or religious doctrines").
184.
MARSDEN, supranote 151, at 68.
185. "Islam is not simply a basis for individual faith but a system that
encompasses all aspects of society, including individual behaviour and the relationship
of the individual to both society and the state. There is therefore no question of the
state being a secular entity and of religion being relegated to the private sphere. The
state is seen as the collective embodiment of the Islamic values espoused by
society...." Id. at 69.
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human rights-survive whatever comprehensive religious or moral
doctrines (as well as their instantiation in domestic law and practice)
govern society presupposes a real dichotomy between religious and
secular law. States that reject this dichotomy will not find positivist
universality compelling. This means that in certain "rogue" states
international human rights will not enjoy universal respect; it does
not, however, necessarily refute their normative universality. Again,
we have conceded that no descriptive consensus supports empirically
the existence of universally acknowledged human rights. Recall,
however, that the challenge of crude relativism is normative, not
descriptive. It claims, not simply that cultural pluralism exists, but
that the external imposition of human rights norms on cultures that
purport to reject them is somehow illegitimate or unjustified.
2. The Cross-Cultural Consensus Approach
Alternatively, then, one might seek to repudiate crude relativism
by resort to a culture's internal resources.
Norms that promote
186
human dignity exist in nearly all societies.
Properly interpreted,
recast, and reoriented, these norms arguably can be redeployed in the
service of human rights; they provide the "raw material" from which
to forge genuine "cross-cultural" universality.
Like the legal
87
positivists, exponents of this view, such as Abdullahi A. An-Na'im
and Charles Taylor, 188 acknowledge the descriptive fact of cultural
pluralism but still embrace the universality of human rights. They
argue, however, that any successful rejoinder to the crude cultural
relativist must come from within the relativist's own cultural
tradition. True legitimacy, An-Na'im writes, requires that "shared
moral values be authentic and not imposed from outside ....
[Values
must be] legitimate with reference to the norms and mechanisms of
change within a particular culture.' 1 89 Taylor likewise concludes that
"[c]ontrary to what many people think, world convergence will not
come through a loss or denial of traditions all around, but rather by

186.
See generally DONNELLY, supra note 5, at 49-65 (surveying alternative
conceptions of human dignity in major non-Western, non-liberal traditions but arguing
that each, upon analysis, does not equate with human rights).
187.
E.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, The Cultural Mediation of Human
Rights: The Al-Arqam Case in Malaysia, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 138, at 147; Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward a Cross.Cultural
Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in HUMAN RIGHTS INCROSSCULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 105, at 19; Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, The
Contingent Universality of Human Rights: The Case of Freedom of Expression in
African and Islamic Contexts, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 29 (1997).
188.
See Charles Taylor, Conditions of an Unforced Consensus in Human Rights,
in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 138, at 124.
189.
An-Na'im, Toward a Cross-CulturalApproach, supra note 179, at 25.
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creative reimmersions of different groups, each in their own spiritual
heritage, traveling different routes to the same goal."' 90 In short, the
cross-cultural approach seeks to repudiate the crude cultural
relativist challenge by reappropriating the very cultural traditions
relied upon by the relativist to justify behavior that violates universal
human rights.191 Relative to the relativist's own cultural traditions
and viewed in the right interpretive light, such behavior appears
illegitimate.
Understood as a strategic measure, the cross-cultural approach
warrants considerable praise. Rote attempts to compel adherence to
human rights norms by citing their codification in international
instruments will, as the above-quoted exchange between the Special
Rapporteur and the Taliban's attorney general indicates, frequently
prove innocuous, particularly where a state's political elite refuses to
acknowledge international law. 192 To employ concepts of value and
human dignity already internalized by a given cultural tradition may
be far more effective. 193 Michael Ignatieff, for example, recounts that,

190.
Taylor, supranote 188, at 144.
191.
See id. at 142 (extolling the "possibilities of reinterpretation and
reappropriation that [each] tradition itself contains").
192.
While the Taliban exemplifies one group that refuses to ackmowledge
international obligations that contravene its comprehensive moral, legal and political
doctrines, this phenomena is not limited to non-liberal states. Indeed, the U.S.
Senate's reservation to the ICCPR, which declared that the United States ratifies
subject to the understanding that the treaty requires no changes inconsistent with its
domestic constitutional law, might be cited as a paradigmatic example. SENATE
COMMITEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIviL AND POLrTICAL RIGHTS, Jan. 30, 1992, para. 3.4, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 660
(1992) ("Nothing in this Covenant requires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by
the United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as
interpreted by the United States."). The Human Rights Committee, charged under
Article 40 of the ICCPR with the interpretation and implementation of its provisions.
famously responded to this assertion by noting that, where states adopt "videly
formulated reservations which essentially render ineffective all Covenant rights which
would require any change in national law[,]" no real international rights or obligations
have thus been accepted. General Comment No. 24 On Issues Relating to Reservations
Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocolsthereto,
or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, Human Rights
Committee, 52d Sess., 1382d mtg., para. 12, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/21IRev.lIAdd.6 (1994),
reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 839, 843. (1995). For a critical overview of American "cultural
relativism," see Johan D. van der Vyver, Universality & Relativity of Human Rights
American Relativism, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 43 (1998).
193.
Indeed, the International Court of Justice has affirmed rhetorically the
efficacy of the cross-cultural approach:
It greatly strengthens the concept of humanitarian laws of war to note that this
is not a recent invention, nor the product of any one culture ....
(I]t is deeprooted in many cultures-Hindu, Buddhist, Chinese, Christian, Islamic and
traditional African. These cultures have all given expression to a variety of
limitations on the extent to which any means can be used for the purposes of
fighting one's enemy. The problem under consideration is a universal problem,
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to encourage the Taliban to comply with the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 194 the International Committee of the Red Cross

disseminated pamphlets invoking Islamic iconography and maxims,
reappropriating

these

cultural

resources

in

the

service

of

international humanitarian law. 195 An-Na'im similarly contends that
arguments based upon Shari'a-citing the Prophet's maxim that "if
there is any doubt, . . . the Qur'anic punishment should not be
imposed'"-will more effectively limit the controversial criminal
punishments (hudud) imposed by some Islamic states. 196 But note
that these examples address the means of realizing an international

public order that maximizes respect for the ends promoted by human
rights. They do not address the logically prior question of what ends
ought to be advanced by this, or any other, strategy, and as Isaiah
Berlin famously observed, "[w]here ends are agreed, the only
questions left are those of means, and these are not political but
technical, that is to say, capable of being settled by experts or
1 97
machines like arguments between engineers or doctors."
Yet "ends" are precisely what crude relativism challenges.
Undoubtedly, reappropriating existing cultural resources to promote
world convergence on fundamental ends is perhaps the most
promising technical method of forging a cross-cultural consensus
about human rights-one that might eventually suffice to be deemed
true descriptive universality. 198 But this presupposes actors, like An-

Na'im and Taylor, who are in fact already committed to the very
human rights norms that crude relativism challenges.

The cross-

and this Court is a universal Court, whose composition is required by its
Statute to reflect the world's principal cultural traditions. The multicultural
traditions that exist on this important matter cannot be ignored in the Court's
consideration of this question, for to do so would be to deprive its conclusions of
that plenitude of universal authority which is available to give it added
strength-the strength resulting from the depth of the tradition's historical
roots and the width of its geographical spread.
InternationalCourt of Justice: Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 809, 896 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
194.
Convention (No. I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and the Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention
(No. II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
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196.
See An-Na'im, Toward a Cross-CulturalApproach, supranote 179, at 36.
197.
Berlin, supra note 52, at 118.
198.
See JOHNSTON, supra note 32, at 16 (noting that "criticisms that appeal to
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cultural approach begins by presuming that universal human rights
represent the desirable end-state. It then inquires how, in a global
order characterized descriptively by cultural pluralism, one may
effectively establish conditions under which, more often than not,
international human rights receive respect.
The cross-cultural
approach's answer is to manipulate and redeploy each culture's
internal resources in the service of human rights.
This is not to criticize the "cross-cultural consensus"
methodology. It is merely to note that, while laudable as a strategic
tool, the cross-cultural, like the legal positivist approach, does not
directly address the normative challenge of crude cultural relativism.
Nor do its proponents intend it to do so. In fact, implicit in An-Na'im
and Taylor's arguments is the notion that the external imposition of
human rights-as conceived in the Western liberal tradition-is not
justified in some privileged sense that alternative conceptions of
human dignity lack. Rather, the objective seems to reside in
amalgamating the most broadly-shareable mores of each society in an
effort to achieve an overlapping consensus of basic values that most
cultures will respect most of the time. While there may be no reason
to object to this goal, it cannot be equated with an international order
guided by universal respect for human rights.
3. Outrelativizing Relativism
Crude cultural relativism, however, does more than acknowledge
cultural pluralism. It infers a questionable conclusion from this
empirical fact--"that no transcendent or trans-cultural ideas of right
can be found or agreed on, and hence that no culture (whether or not
in the guise of enforcing international human rights) is justified in
attempting to impose on others what must be understood as its own
ideas." 19 9 This proposition states a fundamental challenge that any
successful defense of the universality of human rights must address.
To begin, then, we should ask why it strikes us as problematic in the
first place. The answer is that we are disturbed by the idea of
imposing on others; it seems to legitimize coercion. Again, we find
that arguments about the universality of human rights distill to
arguments about the propriety of coercion.
Under what
circumstances is it justified, in relation to individuals, to cultures,
and to states? Needless to say, this question is perhaps the core
inquiry of political philosophy, 20 0 and its comprehensive treatment is
beyond the scope of this article. But its assessment cannot be wholly
avoided, for it speaks to the central question under consideration, i.e.,
the propriety of imposing human rights on cultures that purport to
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STEINER & ALSTON, supranote 6, at 193 (emphasis added).
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reject them. Before turning to coercion, however, this Article
suggests a number of preliminary, though admittedly non-dispositive,
rejoinders to crude relativism.
First, independent of the substantive legitimacy of coercion,
crude relativism undermines itself. It suffers from the Humean
naturalistic fallacy.
Simply put, no value claim-a normative
"ought"-finds logical support in any purely factual claim-a
descriptive "is". Bernard Williams concisely captures this difficulty in
his essay An Inconsistent Form of Relativism.20 1 The "vulgar
relativist" proposition, he notes, reduces to the following syllogism:
[T]hat 'right' means (can only be coherently understood as meaning)
'right for a given society'; that 'right for a given society' is to be
understood in a functionalist sense; and that (therefore) it is wrong for
people in one society to condemn, interfere with, etc. the values of
202
another society.

But this logic is self-evidently pathological. It proposes, at once, that:
(1) all claims of right must be understood as relative to the culture
making them; but that (2) one such claim-that imposing foreign
values on a society that does not share them is morally wrongmerits universal respect notwithstanding the truth of relativism.
Crude cultural relativism presumes that the descriptive fact of
cultural pluralism compels the normative value conclusion that every
culture should tolerate the practices of every other culture. But this
latter claim simply does not follow from the former.
As
anthropologist Elvin Hatch notes, 'To say that values vary from
culture to culture is to describe (accurately or not) an empirical state
of affairs in the real world, whereas the call for tolerance is a value
judgment of what ought to be, and it is logically impossible to derive
the one from the other. '20 3 The crude relativist's challenge to the
"moral imperialism" of international human rights thus suffers from
an internal pathology of logic.
This rejoinder, however, remains somewhat trivial. It shows
only that cultural pluralism does not lead inexorably to the
conclusion that no culture may interfere justifiably in the affairs of
another. It might still be true that cultural groups should generally
refrain from imposing their values onto others that do not share
them. A complex system of internalized values in large measure
defines a culture. 'To be acculturated means to have adopted at a
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See Williams, supra note 10, at 171-74.
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ANTHROPOLOGY 8 (1983), reprinted in STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 6, at 196; see also
Williams, supra note 10, at 173 (noting that the "central confusion of relativism is to
try to conjure out of the fact that societies have differing attitudes and values an a
priorinonrelative principle to determine the attitude of one society to another").
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very deep level of consciousness-so deep that one is often unaware of
its effect on contemporary behavior-the fundamental postulates of a
particular system. ' 20 4 It may therefore be desirable to forbear, where
possible, from disturbing these fundamental postulates. Insofar as it
upsets the stability of a cultural community, to interpose foreign
values may cause more harm than good. Even from a liberal
perspective, as Kymlicka argues, "freedom is intimately linked with
and dependent on culture"20 5 because it "involves making choices
amongst various options, and our societal culture not only provides
these options, but also makes them meaningful to us.1 20 6
Yet disparities in cultural values and practices cannot simply be
ignored. Indeed, it is precisely because cultural survival depends
upon the internalization of certain values that they cannot "merely
evaporate because one is confronted with human beings in another
society." 20 7 Few today, for example, would resort to cultural
relativism to defend cultural practices that sanction slavery, human
sacrifice, or genocide. These "easy cases" do not show a universal
consensus.
But they indicate that what Donnelly calls "radical
cultural relativism"-the notion that "culture is the [sole] source of
the validity of a moral right or rule" 2 0 8-is not the view that most
relativists defend when they question the universality of human
rights. The issue is rather whether and to what extent cultural
pluralism counsels against imposing foreign norms onto a cultural
group that does not share them, either because in theory, this
imposition is somehow morally illegitimate; or, in practice, the
introduction of foreign norms threatens to disrupt the integrity of a
cultural community.
In the latter case, however, while recognizing the force of
Kymlicka's argument that "access to a societal culture" is a necessary
condition for "meaningful individual choice[,]" 209 one must also bear
in mind that the very same "societal culture" can at times constitute
the principal barrier to individual choice. For instance, certain
Christian sects-the Amish-shield children in their culture from
ordinary public education, fearing that this exposure could enable
and animate decisions to exit their discrete cultural community. 210
Thus, if one agrees that ensuring "meaningful individual choice"autonomy-is critical, we must ask whether the extent and nature of
cultural "disruption" that might be caused by 'Imposing" human
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rights universally will be offset by the value of vesting formerly
disenfranchised individuals or social classes with the protections that
international human rights law extends to all persons.
Several further difficulties weaken the crude relativist normative
challenge. For example, it often presumes a high level of cultural
homogeneity within a nation-state. This proves fictitious in two
senses. First, the cultural values alleged to characterize a given
community are rarely as univocal or ubiquitous as the relativist
claims; and second, the interpretation that these cultural values
receive often reflects more the self-interest of the elites than it does
traditions and practices cherished by the cultural community as a
whole. When the Taliban's acting foreign minister, Sher Muhammad
Stanakzai, proclaims, "[t]hose who consider the imposition of [our]
law to be against human rights are insulting all Muslims and their
211
beliefs," it is surely not the case that "all Muslims" would agree.
As An-Na'im notes, within a single culture, multiple perceptions and
interpretations of its constitutive shared values subsist.2 12 Cultural
pluralism does not, that is, simply stand for disputes between "Islam

211.
MARSDEN, supra note 151, at 63 (quoting Sher Muhammad Stanakzai,
Voice of Sharia Radio, Nov. 20, 1996). See generally Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal
Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash With a Construct?, 15
MICH. J. INT'L L. 307 (1994). "An examination going beyond the official rhetoric about
Islamic human rights[,]" Mayer argues,
reveals that there is no real consensus on the part of Muslims that their
religion mandates a culturally distinctive approach to rights or that it
precludes the adoption of international human rights norms. In fact, the
relationship of Islamic culture to the positions that Muslims inside and outside
governments are currently articulating on human rights is neither a simple nor
a direci one, and the range of Muslims' attitudes on human rights defies
Orientalist stereotypes and facile generalizations about a supposedly
monolithic Islamic culture.
Id. at 309. Thus, for example, the Special Rapporteur to Afghanistan, in the wake of
the Taliban's military conquest, was informed by a Sunni Islamic scholar that "the
Taliban's interpretation of the Koran was not correct and that many of the rules they
applied had nothing to do with Islam but were in fact reflections of local
interpretations and tribal customs." FinalReport on the Situation of Human Rights in
Afghanistan Submitted by Mr. Choong-Hyun Paik, Special Rapporteur, in Accordance
with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1996/75, Commission on Human
Rights, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 10, para. 29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4l1997l59 (1997); see also
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, The Situation of
Women and Girls in Afghanistan, Sub-Commission Res. 1999/14, para. 3 (1999) (noting
that the Taliban's moral strictures in relation to women are "totally at variance with
the precepts of Islam, which imposes on Muslims the duty to acquire an education, as a
number of ulemas have confirmed to the Special Rapportuer on the situation of human
rights in Afghanistan").
212.
An-Na'im, Toward a Cross CulturalApproach, supranote 179, at 20.
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and the West ' 213 but also for internal disagreements among Islamic
cultural groups and nation-states.
Likewise, in the context of the "Asian values" debate, Yash Ghai
points out that "neither Asian culture nor Asian realities are
homogenous throughout the continent."2 14 Thus, for example, some
"Asian values" theorists claim that Confucian cultural traditions in
East and Southeast Asia create greater popular desire for the social
order and efficient governance allegedly enabled by authoritarian
regimes than for democracy. 215 But the Dalai Lama, as one
prominent exemplar of the diverse Buddhist traditions of Asia,
expresses the view that "not only are Buddhism and democracy
compatible, they are rooted in a common understanding of the
equality and potential of every individual."2 16 The point here is not
that one view or the other is correct, but rather that we have no
reason to assume that the State-to whom universal human rights
law principally applies-speaks with a monolithic cultural voice. In
the era of the nation-state, rarely, if ever, do territorial boundaries
embrace a single cultural tradition.2 17 A "cultural" rejection of
universal human rights law may therefore reflect, not universal
cultural norms, but particular perceptions, understandings, and
interpretations of these norms.
Which interpretations tend to be at war with the prerogatives of
universal human rights? This question invites a more cynical
rejoinder to crude cultural relativism. Scholars and human rights
activists alike observe that frequently it is not cultural values that
inhibit societies from realizing a legal order that respects universal
human rights; it is the self-serving manipulation of these values by
elites. 2 18 Authoritarian leaders often invoke cultural relativism to
cloak the characteristic abuses of totalitarian rule:
Arguments of cultural relativism regularly involve urban elites
eloquently praising the glories of village life-a life that they or their
parents . . . struggled hard to escape . . . . Government officials

denounce the corrosive individualism of Western values-while they
line their pockets with the proceeds of massive corruption .... Leaders
sing the praises of traditional communities-while they wield arbitrary

power antithetical to traditional values, pursue development policies

213.
See generally HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 209-18 (arguing that the roots
of conflict between the nVest" and the "Islamic World" stretch back far in history and.
particularly since the end of the Cold War, have been escalating).
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that systematically undermine traditional communities, and replace
219
traditional leaders with corrupt cronies and party hacks.

U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan echoed this same conclusion in a
recent statement at the Aspen Institute: "It is never the people who
complain of human rights as a Western or Northern imposition. It is
You do not need to explain the
too often their leaders who do so ....
meaning of human rights to an Asian mother or an African father
whose son or daughter has been tortured or killed. They understand
it-tragically-far better than we ever will. ''220 Yet the use of culture
to justify human rights violations need not be self-consciously cynical.
At times, societal elites-such as the Brahmin caste in traditional
Hindu society-rely subconsciously upon deeply ingrained cultural
beliefs to legitimize their self-assessment of practices that offend
221
human rights norms.
Finally, to the extent that states advance crude relativist
objections to universal human rights, we should bear in mind that
these arguments assume unjustifiably an identity between
government objectives and cultural values. Human rights abuses, as
noted above, imply official complicity. When they are not perpetrated
directly by governmental, quasi-governmental, or paramilitary
groups, human rights abuses nonetheless enjoy either official
sanction or, at the very least, tolerance. Absent some form of official
complicity, the abuse perhaps constitutes a crime but not, strictly
speaking, a human rights violation.
Thus, if crude relativism
provides a respectable reason to abrogate international human rights,
it must be true that a state's objectives may be identified legitimately
with the cultural values invoked to defend the practice at issue. But
"[t]he community and State are different institutions and to some
'222
extent in a contrary juxtaposition.
Not surprisingly, where many egregious patterns of human
rights violations occur, it strains credulity to make this simple

219. Id.
220.
Press Release, 'Ignorance,not Knowledge... Makes Enemies of Man,' SecretaryGeneral Tells Communications Conference at Aspen Institute (Oct. 20, 1997), at
http:/www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/(Symbol)/SG.SM.6366.En?Opendocument;
see
also Controversiesand Culture,supra note 5, at 10 (noting that it "tends to be the people in
power who use Islamic or Asian values to justify political repression and restrictions of
rights, and it tends to be the people they are repressing who appeal to the outside world to
uphold those rights); Jim Hoagland, Asian Values? Masses Use Different Definition Than
Ruling Class Does, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 19, 1998, at 15A, 1998 WL 2537894.
221.
See An-Na'im, Toward a Cross-CulturalApproach, supra note 179, at 20
(noting that it is normal for elites to "maintain perceptions and interpretations of
cultural values and norms that are supportive of their own interests, proclaiming them
to be the only valid view of that culture').
222.
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identification. In fact, when human rights abuses occur on a massive
and systematic scale, it is frequently because the state, or, more
commonly, one cultural or national elite that seizes control of the
state, seeks to suppress or destroy certain other cultural, ethnic, or
political groups within its territory. The war in the former
Yugoslavia is a case in point. Likewise, in the Rwandan genocide of
1994, it was not culture per se, but a political elite's manipulation
and exacerbation of preexisting socio-cultural divisions within
2 23
Rwandan society that caused the systematic slaughter of Tutsi.
Again, in the People's Republic of China of the 1960s and 1970s,
nothing about Chinese-still less "Asian"-values sanctioned the
massive destruction and terror of the Cultural Revolution. Indeed,
ironically, this human rights catastrophe involved an attempt to
eradicate traditional Chinese cultural values in the service of a state
ideology that, far from being shared by its citizenry, grew out of the
radical ideas of a long-dead social critic of nineteenth-century
In short, particularly in states that lack
industrial Europe.
democratic institutions, the crude cultural relativist's identification of
the state-and its objectives-with the cultural values of its people
remains dubious.
IV. RELATiviSM REVISITED: UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING THE

LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF AUTONOMY AND REASONABLE TOLERANCE

The above arguments cast doubt upon the empirical accuracy
and sincerity of cultural relativist challenges to universal human
rights. But assume that a state's practices conform to the values of
many of its citizens. Assume further that its population is relatively
homogeneous and that the state's elite pursues policies that
genuinely reflect many of its people's cultural values. Finally,
assume that these values manifest an alternative conception of
human dignity, but one that is largely incompatible with
international human rights law. Under these circumstances, do
human rights enjoy some privileged status that merits their
application to a culture that appears to reject them? This Part
concludes that, even in such an implausible scenario, they do.
In this context, the following discussion revisits the example of
the Taliban. For its leaders, structuring Afghan society according to
their interpretation of Shar'ia promotes human dignity, insulates
men and women from corruption, and shields citizens from the

See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE
223.
IN RWANDA 1 (1999) ("[Tlhis genocide was not an uncontrollable outburst of rage by a
people consumed by 'ancient tribal hatreds' . . . . [It] resulted from the deliberate
choice of a modern elite to foster hatred and fear to keep itself in power.").
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corrosive influence of decadent Western practices. The Taliban are
not unique in this respect. Many groups impose strictures on their
members to preserve existing social arrangements and to prevent the
deterioration of, or to reestablish, "traditional" cultural mores. These
strictures force individuals to obey societal norms, often in violation
of international human rights law. At the same time, the crude
relativist argues, these alternative cultural arrangements merit
tolerance; it would be wrong for foreigners to coerce societal
compliance with international human rights.
The debate thus returns full circle to the question of coercion. In
practice, the objections sketched above often betray the
disingenuousness of crude relativism. But a compelling defense of
universal human rights must interpret the position charitably for the
argument's sake. We need to appraise whether cultural pluralism, by
itself, indicates that certain kinds of coercion intended to enforce
international human rights are illegitimate. But what aspect of
coercion would render it "illegitimate" or "unjustified" in any context?
Obviously, we do not disapprove of all forms of coercion. Without
violating human rights, states compel citizens to pay taxes, to serve
on juries, at times to enlist in the army, and so forth. Therefore, we
have no difficulty with forcing children to attend school and receive
an education. 224 But we balk at the Taliban's strictures that force
women to behave in certain ways and that forbid them certain forms
of education and employment.
In the liberal tradition, the salient difference resides in the
understanding of the nature of the coercion in each case. Isaiah
Berlin defined coercion as "the deliberate interference of other human
beings within the area in which I could otherwise act.

'225

Where this

interference serves, broadly speaking, the institutions that preserve
human freedom and choice-as education, taxes, and jury duty all
arguably do-it does not strike us as illegitimate. By contrast, where
coercion interferes substantially with human freedom and choice, it
becomes untenable:
It is one thing to require people to do jury duty or to vote, and quite
another to compel people to attend a particular church or to follow
traditional gender roles. The former are intended to uphold liberal
rights and democratic institutions, the latter restrict these rights in the
22 6
name of cultural tradition or religious orthodoxy.

The quintessential idea that motivates this distinction is the peculiar
liberal conception of the self.227 For this reason, the following

224.
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discussion, which expounds the source of respect for autonomy within
the liberal tradition, applies, first and foremost, to individuals. It
applies to communities only insofar as they can genuinely be
understood to enable the kind of meaningful individual choice that
the liberal tradition venerates. 2 28 It would remain perfectly coherent
for a community-based or patriarchal society to reject this
idiosyncratic conception of the self and its concomitant concern with
individual autonomy. But then to purport to reject the universality of
human rights on cultural relativist grounds requires that the
proponent of relativism explain why coercion-in the form of
imposing international human rights lawv-is illegitimate. Absent
some presently unarticulated alternative, the contention is that
cultural relativism necessarily appeals, albeit tacitly, to the liberal
principle of autonomy. An appeal to autonomy, however, is only
available to the extent that the rationale for valuing autonomy holds
true. This rationale, in turn, is inextricably linked to a belief that the
individual is the fundamental unit of concern and source of value.
Cultural relativism therefore cannot embrace autonomy to reject the
universal applicability of human rights, but then dispense with
autonomy in relation to the very source of its value and rationalethe liberal conception of the individual.
Liberals understand the self as an agent, a being capable of
229
formulating personal projects according to widely diverse values.
Robert Nozick-one exemplar of this tradition-sets forth this vision
of the self-and its many philosophical assumptions-in Anarchy,
State & Utopia.230 We conceive of the self, he writes, as "sentient and
self-conscious; rational (capable of using abstract concepts, not tied to
responses to immediate stimuli); possessing free will; [and] being a
moral agent," as a being that is able "to regulate and guide its life in
23 1
accordance with some overall conception it chooses to accept."
Liberals therefore try to establish social and legal institutions that do
not interfere with each person's autonomous pursuit of his or her
values.
The rationale for this principle of tolerance is neither obvious nor
obviously correct. It stems from the controversial assumption that
no one set of values-no single "conception of the good"-is right for
everyone. This claim could be metaethical, empirical, or both. It
could mean that, as a matter of metaethics, personal, cultural, and
societal differences render certain values worthier of pursuit for some

definition of man, and freedom can be made to mean whatever the manipulator
wishes.").
228.
229.
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See generallyROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE & UTOPIA (1971).
Id. at 48-49.
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people than for others; or it could mean that, empirically, even if one
set of values is in fact right for everyone we cannot know this. But
critically, note that in either case the rationale for valuing autonomy
reduces to the same basic claim-that choice is the prerequisite for
individuals to give meaning to their lives.
So stated, the argument against coercion appears highly quixotic
and by no means shared by the world's diverse cultural traditions.
Many religious, moral, and cultural doctrines, far from disclaiming
knowledge of the good life, advance strong conceptions of it that
demand universal assent. The Taliban-though they are hardly
unique in this regard-do not recognize a Rawlsian distinction
between, on the one hand, mere "political" conceptions of right that
can be switched on and off as one moves in and out of the public
political arena and, on the other hand, comprehensive private moral
and religious doctrines. 23 2 Quite the contrary, the latter encompass
and ordain the former. Moreover, even assuming we do acknowledge
this distinction, as Kymlicka rhetorically asks, "[W]e know that some
people will make imprudent decisions, wasting their time on hopeless
or trivial pursuits. Why then should the government not intervene to
protect us from making mistakes, and to compel us to lead the truly
233
good life?"
The answer, he emphasizes, resides in human fallibility. We
recognize that, "[sjince we can be wrong about the worth or value of
what we are currently doing, and since no one wants to lead a life
based on false beliefs about its worth, it is of fundamental importance
that we be able rationally to assess our conceptions of the good in the
light of new information or experiences, and to revise them if they are
not worthy of our continued allegiance." 23 4 A liberal conception of
"rights as trumps" against the demands of the community or the state
finds its justification in two interrelated ideas: First, that everyone
must "have the resources and liberties needed to lead their lives in
accordance with their beliefs about value . . .;" and second, that
individuals also need the information and liberty to "question those
beliefs, to examine them in light of . . . an awareness of different
views about the good life" and, if warranted, to revise them. 235
Human rights, as one peculiar subset of rights generally, seek to
protect human dignity by preserving each person's ability to choose

232.
See generally RAWLS, supra note 126.
233.
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multiculturalism.
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schools of thought, from classical liberals like J.S. Mill to modern liberals like John
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among the diverse conceptions of ultimate value that different
cultures embrace.
We live in a world, not of competing relativisms--"these values
embody the good for a circumscribed set of persons leading lives in
this particular cultural context"-but of competing universalisms-"these values embody the good." 236 Paradoxically, then, the feature of
comprehensive "conceptions of the good" that proves most adverse to
an international order structured by respect for universal human
rights is dogmatic universalism-the claim that one system of value
prescribes what "is right" for everyone and can therefore be justifiably
imposed, through violence if necessary, on others. At first glance, this
appears to beg the question. Does not the phrase "universal human
rights" imply precisely such a system of values? Is it not precisely
this "imperialistic" feature of international human rights that
cultural relativists reject?
These questions indicate that liberalism's preoccupation with
"rights" does not render it, as some argue, wholly neutral towards
different conceptions of the good.2 37 It cannot tolerate any conception
of the good life that requires suppression of the conditions under
which free and informed choice by individuals remains possible.
Simply stated, liberalism rejects institutional arrangements that do
not preserve autonomy. Yet clearly, some cultural value systems,
which in the view of their adherents promote human dignity, actually
demand the repression of autonomy.
By restricting women's
educational opportunities, the Taliban destroy the conditions under
which women can make free and informed choices about what
values-and, consequently, what life and vision of human dignitythey wish to embrace. Human rights, then, do not permit cultures
absolute latitude to structure their socio-political and legal
arrangements as they choose; in this respect, they may fairly be

deemed "imperious."
But at the same time, human rights do not compel any one
particular set of values.238 Within constraints delineated by the
autonomy principle, international human rights provide an

236.
Eck, supranote 118, at 18-19.
237.
See JOHNSTON, supra note 32, at 25. The idea that liberalism is neutral
toward conceptions of the good is the notion that, within a libertarian socio-political
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values economic development and another values ecological conservation, conflict will
inevitably result; and no "neutral" principle will tell them how to settle these disputes
or how to make choices that do not potentially erode each others' values.
238.
"Human-rights obligations bar coercion by government or law; they do not
mandate a particular social outcome. True, legal and social coercion can be difficult to
distinguish, but international human-rights norms can deal only with the legal issues."
Controversiesand Culture,supra note 5, at 10.
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overarching political and legal framework that permits individuals
and cultural units relatively broad latitude to structure their social
circumstances and to pursue their values as they see fit.
International human rights therefore prove far more inclusive of
diverse conceptions of cultural value than alternative functional
Most non-rights-based
concepts for promoting human dignity.
conceptions of human dignity insist upon a singular substantive
conception of the good; they therefore demand adherence to specific
values, ideologies, and attendant behaviors.
The human rights
tradition is unique in that it does not demand adherence precisely
because the universal human rights tradition, far from denying
pluralism and far from denying diverse conceptions of cultural value,
is animated by the distinctively liberal presumption of reasonable
value pluralism.
With this background in mind, recall that crude cultural
relativism challenges the alleged "intolerance" of universal human
rights as illegitimate-an unjustified imposition of foreign values on a
cultural community that does not share them. But what could
"illegitimate" mean in this context? Crude cultural relativism, after
all, vehemently defends the proposition that conceptions of legitimacy
are culturally determined. Yet, as has been seen, it fails to support
its own argument in this regard because it unjustifiably infers a
normative conception of legitimacy from a mere descriptive fact. To
substantiate its challenge, then, cultural relativism must appeal to
some other principle-other than merely "the truth of relativism" that can differentiate legitimate from illegitimate coercion. The
liberal tradition-and the distinctive conception of "human rights" to
which it gave rise-suggests one: roughly, respect for individual
autonomy. "What distinguishes liberal tolerance is precisely its
commitment to autonomy-that is, the idea that individuals should
be free to assess and potentially revise their existing ends." 23 9 But
crude cultural relativism cannot rely on the autonomy principle to
repudiate the universality of human rights while at the same time
violating this principle in relation to members of its own society. As
Arthur Schlesinger observed in the context of the debate over
multiculturalism, "One of the oddities of the situation is that the
assault on the Western tradition is conducted very largely with
analytical weapons forged in the West. '24 0 The same can be said, in
short, of the vast majority of cultural relativist objections to universal
241
human rights.
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KYMLICKA, supranote 4, at 158.
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Other principles for differentiating legitimate from illegitimate
coercion in the context of diverse cultural communities do exist. The
most well-known, the Ottoman "millet" system, permitted Greek
Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish communities subsisting
within the Ottoman Empire to structure their internal affairs as they
saw fit, though "their relations with the ruling Muslims were tightly
regulated."s 42 Historically, this system provided a relatively humane
and stable system of tolerance among religious groups. 243 Yet it
permitted these groups to impose restrictions internally on the
autonomy of their respective members, and theoretically, it is not
clear on what basis-other than the pragmatics of ruling an empirethis distinction could be justified. A "millet"-like system remains
plausible today. In a rough sense, international law traditionally
proceeded from an analogous principle, regulating relations among
states but permitting each sole authority over matters "essentially
within [its] domestic jurisdiction." But after abandoning
transcendental concepts of right, the appropriate inquiry becomes
whether, regardless of its presently unarticulated theoretical
justification, this system would be desirable today, in an
interdependent global community of highly diverse peoples and
states.

V. CONCLUSION

Crude cultural relativism emphasizes correctly that conceptions
of human dignity respond to the prevailing social and cultural
features of the society in which they develop. But to accept this
premise invites the following question:
Which mechanism for
promoting human dignity responds most appropriately to the threats
to human dignity posed by contemporary social and historical
contingencies? Jack Donnelly, Rhoda Howard, and other scholars
have observed that international human rights are peculiarly wellsuited to protect persons from the threats to human dignity posed by
the modern nation-state, market economies, and industrialization.
These conditions do not exist to the same degree in all regions of the
world. But today, they penetrate virtually every state, culture, and

cultural relativists tend to employ a distinctly Western political morality, logic, and
vocabulary in their efforts to rebut the universality of human rights).
242.
KYMLICKA, supranote 4, at 156.
243.
See Benjamin Braude & Bernard Lewis, Introduction to CHRISTL'S AND
JEWS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: THE FUNCTIONING OF A PLURAL SOCIETY 1 (Benjamin

Braude & Bernard Lewis eds., 1982) C'For nearly half a millennium the Ottomans
ruled an empire as diverse as any in history. Remarkably, this polyethnic and
multireligious society worked."), quoted in KYMLICKA, supra note 4, at 157.
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This may explain why

"[w]hen Chinese students cried and died for democracy in Tiananmen
Square, they brought with them not representations of Confucius or
Buddha but a model of the Statue of Liberty.''245 The liberal value of
individual autonomy that finds expression in universal human rights
law resonates with the particular needs of human beings faced with
threats to human dignity posed by the modern nation-state and its
instrumentalities.
Absent a transcendental justification, which is both undesirable
and dangerous, resort to the liberal principle of autonomy to vindicate
the universality of human rights does not provide a philosophicallyhermetic rebuttal to the relativist's charge that human rights
"impose" foreign norms. But one must appraise this challenge, not in
isolation, but in context and by reference to its logical alternative-an
international laissez-faire system that permits elites (often those who
control the military) to impose their conception of the good upon
subordinate groups and individuals, armed with the machinery of the
state.
In practice, cultural relativism rarely states a sincere call for
cultural tolerance; in theory, cultural relativism lacks any coherent
theoretical ground to demand tolerance. At the outset, then, one has
reason to view cultural relativist claims with skepticism. But
universal human rights law also claims two affirmative policy
justifications. First, it is maximally inclusive. Within limits dictated
by the autonomy principle, international human rights law
accommodates the greatest diversity of alternative cultural
conceptions of human dignity; in other words, it is the most tolerant
of cultural pluralism. Second, international human rights law is the
uniquely appropriate mechanism to counterbalance the threats to
human dignity posed by the nation-state, its offshoots, and its
instrumentalities. To acknowledge the universality of human rights,
then, is not to deny cultural pluralism or the relativity of value. It is
to recognize the normative force of the system of international human
rights in the face of cultural relativist challenges-which, in the end,

244.
See DONNELLY, supra note 5, at 64-65. Donnelly suggests that "where
there is a thriving indigenous cultural tradition and community, arguments of cultural
relativism offer a strong defense against outside interference-including disruptions
that might be caused by introducing 'universal' human rights." Id. at 118. But such
communities, he argues, rarely exist in an unadulterated form in the modern world.
"Even most rural areas of the Third World have been substantially penetrated, and the
local culture 'corrupted,' by foreign practices and institutions, including the modern
state, the money economy, and 'Western' values, products, and practices." Id. at 119.
Consequently, human rights become necessary to fill a vacuum created by the
disappearance or corruption of alternative social institutions and arrangements that
may once have protected human dignity.
245.
SCHLESINGER, supra note 240, at 78.
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appear to state little more than demands for international legal
tolerance of intolerance.

